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Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee
Contracts
Christopher R. Drahozal 59 Vand. L. Rev. 729 (2006)
A common criticism of arbitration is that its upfront costs
(arbitrators' fees and administrative costs) may preclude consumers
and employees from asserting their claims. Some commentators
have argued further that arbitration costs undercut the benefits to
consumers and employees of contingent fee contracts, which permit
the claimants to defer payment of attorneys' fees and litigation
expenses until they prevail in the case (and if they do not prevail,
avoid such costs altogether). This paper argues that this criticism
has it exactly backwards. Rather than arbitration costs interfering
with the workings of contingent fee contracts, the contingent fee
mechanism provides a means for overcoming liquidity and risk
aversion barriers to arbitration. Arbitration costs are just another
form of litigation expense, which attorneys should be willing to
advance on behalf of clients with viable claims. As a result, even
accepting the premises of the cost-based criticism, it does not follow
that arbitration costs necessarily preclude individuals from bringing
their claims in arbitration. Even if individual claimants cannot
afford the forum costs of arbitration, at least some of those
individuals - those with viable claims given the total costs of the
dispute resolution process - should nonetheless be able to bring their
claims. For this reason, much of the legal analysis of arbitration
costs is misdirected, focusing too much on the personal finances of
the individual claimant and too little on the incentives for attorneys
to take the case (such as the value of the claim and possible recovery
under fee-shifting statutes). In the vast majority of federal court
cases adjudicating cost-based challenges to arbitration agreements,
the claimant is represented by counsel and, in most, has asserted a
claim that, if successful, would permit the recovery of attorneys' fees.
This evidence suggests that in most reported cases, even those in
which courts invalidated the arbitration agreement on cost grounds,
arbitration costs were not a barrier to asserting the claim in
arbitration.
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In a widely publicized report, The Costs of Arbitration, the
consumer advocacy group Public Citizen concluded that high upfront
costs in arbitration "have a deterrent effect, often preventing a
claimant from even filing a case."1 Indeed, according to Public Citizen,
"few consumers have actually navigated the [arbitration] process-
most individuals, when confronted by the costs, are forced to drop
their claims."2 Many commentators echo this cost-based criticism of
arbitration. Mark Budnitz stated that "[t]he costs of arbitration can
be so high that they deny consumers access to a forum in which to air
their disputes. '3 Charles Knapp asserted that "where the claimant is
an individual buyer of goods or services, an employee, a health-care
patient, a bank customer, or even a small business attempting to
pursue a claim against a much larger one, the cost of arbitrators' fees
may be prohibitive."4 Reginald Alleyne explained that "[elven when
arbitration litigation costs less than judicial litigation, the timing of
some required arbitration costs, such as upfront fees for the
arbitrator, can make it likely that the arbitration-plaintiff will be
unable to proceed in that forum." 5 The National Consumer Law
Center concluded bluntly: "The upshot is that high arbitration costs
favor companies and hurt consumers by deterring valid claims."
6
The upfront costs of arbitration provide a common ground on
which consumers and employees challenge the enforceability of
1. PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 1 (2002), available at http://www.citizen.
org/documents/ACF1 10A.PDF.
2. Id. at 5. Public Citizen provides no empirical evidence to support this provocative
statement, however, and it seems to be contradicted by the over 5,000 consumer and employment
arbitrations reported by the AAA from January 1, 2005 through June 30, 2005 (as required by
California law), many of which settled or resulted in an award. See American Arbitration
Association, CCP Section 1281.96 Data Collection Requirements (July 1, 2005), www.adr
.org/CDataQ2.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
3. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 161 (2004).
4. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 781 (2002).
5. Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators' Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory Arbitration
for Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 1, 30 (2003).
6. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER TOPICS § 1.3.6, at 9 (4th ed. 2004); see also Dennis Nolan, Labor
and Employment Arbitration: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 40, 47 (1998)




arbitration agreements in court as well. 7 The United States Supreme
Court recognized the availability of such a challenge (in dicta) in
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,8 stating that "[ilt
may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could prevent
a litigant ... from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights
in the arbitral forum."9 Federal courts typically evaluate cost-based
challenges to arbitration agreements by comparing the upfront costs of
arbitration to the upfront costs of litigation, taking into account the
individual claimant's ability to pay. 10 For example, the Sixth Circuit
in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc." required that the costs of
arbitration be compared to the costs of litigation "in a realistic
manner,"12 by which the court evidently meant considering only the
upfront forum costs of each. The court explained that "many litigants
will face minimal costs in the judicial forum, as the attorney will cover
most of the fees of litigation and advance the expenses incurred in
discovery," while "[i]n the arbitral forum, the litigant faces an
additional expense-the arbitrator's fees and costs-which are never
incurred in the judicial forum."13  In determining whether this
additional expense precludes claimants from proceeding in
arbitration, a court "should take the actual plaintiffs income and
resources as representative of [the ability of similarly situated
litigants] to shoulder the costs of arbitration."' 4
The cost-based criticisms and legal challenges are based on
three, seemingly self-evident premises. First, upfront forum costs are
higher in arbitration than in court. Unlike court litigation, which is
subsidized by the government, the parties to arbitration proceedings
must pay all the forum costs-that is, the arbitrator's fees and any
administrative costs. Ordinarily, forum costs in arbitration increase
as the amount of the claim increases, unlike court filing fees, which
are a flat, low amount. 15 Moreover, arbitration rules typically require
the claimant to pay administrative costs and to make a deposit of
7. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative
Dispute Resolution: The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 143, 176-77 (2002) (reporting results of empirical study of cost challenges).
8. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
9. Id. at 90. But the Court held in Green Tree that the plaintiff had failed to make a
sufficient showing of the likely cost of arbitration (without indicating what showing would have
been sufficient). See infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
10. Budnitz, supra note 3, at 154-56; see also infra text accompanying notes 101-116.
11. 317 F.3d 646, 664 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
12. Id. at 664; see also Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004).
13. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 664.
14. Id. at 663.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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arbitrator's fees when the claim is filed.16 As a result, Public Citizen
concluded, "[t]he cost to a plaintiff of initiating an arbitration is
almost always higher than the cost of instituting a lawsuit"-an
amount "up to five thousand percent higher in arbitration than in
court litigation."'
17
Second, at least some individuals cannot afford to pay the
higher upfront costs in arbitration. The Public Citizen report
illustrated this point largely with anecdotes. For example, the report
described cases in which the claimant was an unemployed woman
asserting a legal malpractice claim, a waitress seeking insurance
coverage for chemotherapy and stem cell rescue treatment, and a
retired optometrist who lost his entire retirement savings.'8 More
generally, the report asserted that arbitration costs are likely to be
beyond the means of "people of low- or moderate- income," particularly
in cases in which an individual has lost his or her job or is unable to
pay debts on time. 19
Third, the contingent fee system in litigation permits
individual claimants to avoid paying other process costs-most notably
attorneys' fees-upfront. Under contingent fee contracts, consumers
and employees agree to pay their attorney a percentage of any
recovery, thus enabling even low-income claimants to obtain
representation. Moreover, as the court stated in Morrison, often
attorneys are willing to "cover most of the fees of litigation and
advance the expenses incurred in discovery." 20  Public Citizen
contended that the "requirement of a large upfront filing fee and
deposit toward arbitrator fees . . . severely restricts, or eliminates, the
advantage a consumer has under the contingency fee system."21
This Article challenges the cost-based criticism of arbitration
and argues that the approach to legal challenges taken by courts, like
the Sixth Circuit in Morrison, is misguided. It certainly is not the first
to take issue with the criticisms of arbitration costs, particularly as set
out in the Public Citizen report.22 A common theme among the
16. See infra text accompanying note 50.
17. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 1, at 1.
18. Id. at 8, 21, 25. Not all of the arbitrations cited by Public Citizen involved low-income
claimants. At issue in one arbitration, for example, were alleged defects in a $605,000 home. Id.
at 16.
19. Id. at 52.
20. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 664 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
21. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 1, at 65.
22. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: A
Critique of Public Citizen's Jeremiad on the "Cost of Arbitration" DISP. RESOL. J. 8, 10 (Nov.
2002/Jan. 2003) ("[Tlhe Public Citizen report makes the faulty assumption that lower-income
parties are otherwise being denied their 'day in court' due to mandatory predispute arbitration
[Vol. 59:3:729
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responses is that even if upfront forum costs are higher in arbitration
than in court, as Public Citizen asserts, overall process
costs-including attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses (such as
discovery costs)-are lower.23  As a result, these commentators
conclude that, rather than reducing access to justice, arbitration
enhances access to justice by permitting claimants to bring claims
they could not afford to bring in court. 24 The Supreme Court echoed a
form of this argument in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
25
stating that "arbitration's advantages often would seem helpful to
individuals, say, complaining about a product, who need a less
expensive alternative to litigation."
26
But noticeably lacking from the defenses of arbitration is any
response to the central premises of the cost-based criticism: that the
upfront forum costs in arbitration can exceed the forum costs in court;
that some individuals cannot afford to pay the upfront forum costs in
arbitration; and that the contingent fee system permits individuals to
avoid paying other upfront costs. The defenses of arbitration largely
agreements."); Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 GA.
ST. U.L. REV. 761, 770 n.50 (2003) ('Public Citizen's report fails to consider, however, the costs of
legal representation in its analysis-costs that are often substantial."); News Release, Cato
Institute, Public Citizen Arbitration Study Contains Errors, Half-Truths and Exaggerations,
Scholar Says (May 3, 2002) ("Any honest comparison of arbitration and litigation must include
the cost of legal fees, discovery and delay. Those costs are generally lower in arbitration, and
Public Citizen offers no persuasive evidence to the contrary.") (quoting Professor Stephen J.
Ware), available at http://www.cato.org /new/05-02/05-03-02r-2.html; AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, FAIR PLAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON
CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter AAA, FAIR PLAY].
23. E.g., AAA, FAIR PLAY, supra note 22, at 23 (quoting Lewis L. Maltby):
Arbitration, because it is private, inherently requires those who use the system to pay
the costs. The real question is, and has always been, whether the total cost to the
employee/plaintiff is higher or lower in arbitration. An employee/plaintiff is far better
off spending $2,000 on forum costs and $10,000 on legal fees in arbitration than
virtually nothing on forum costs and $20,000 on legal fees in court.
24. The available empirical evidence provides some support for this view. In a recent study
of American Arbitration Association employment arbitrations, Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth
Hill reported being "unable to compare litigation and arbitration results for lower-paid
employees due to the lack of data about litigation commenced by employees in this economic
group." Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims:
An Empirical Comparison, DiSP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 44, 45. In other words, while
the lower-paid employees in their dataset were able to bring claims in arbitration, the
employment cases in court (at least those not involving discrimination claims) were brought
mostly by higher-paid employees. Eisenberg and Hill concluded that "[lower-pay employees
seem unable to attract the legal representation necessary for meaningful access to court." Id. at
61.
25. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
26. Id. at 280; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001)
("Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of
particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money
than disputes concerning commercial contracts.").
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ignore those premises to focus on the total costs of arbitration. But in
Public Citizen's critique, the total process costs of
arbitration-whether higher or lower 27-are largely irrelevant.
Because of the contingent fee system, individuals do not need to come
up with the money to pay those costs. Instead, the argument goes, it
is only the upfront costs of arbitration that affect the individual's
decision to file a claim. 28 The response-that the total process costs of
arbitration are lower than in court-is thus non-responsive, or at least
incomplete.
This Article argues that the contingent fee contract is the
missing link in the arbitration defenders' chain of argument, providing
a mechanism by which arbitration can enhance, rather than restrict,
claimants' access to justice. Beginning with economic models of the
decision to litigate (or arbitrate), 29 it shows first that, as a general
matter, claimants consider the total cost of the dispute resolution
process in evaluating whether to bring a claim, not merely the upfront
costs. As an economic matter, then, arbitration costs would preclude
claimants from asserting their claims when the expected total costs
(not just the upfront costs) of arbitration exceed the expected value of
the claim. Under these models, the upfront costs of arbitration are
relevant only if the claimant lacks the resources to finance the
litigation or is risk averse. The cost-based critique of arbitration thus
necessarily is based on concerns about liquidity constraints and risk
aversion of consumers and employees.
But that critique ignores the standard device in American
litigation for providing financing and risk sharing: the contingent fee
contract itself. By entering into a contingent fee contract, claimants
are able to defer not only payment of attorneys' fees, but also payment
of other litigation costs, because attorneys may advance such costs on
behalf of their clients. 30 Moreover, attorneys only seek to recover the
litigation expenses they advance from claimants who win their case,
so that "the lawyer effectively insures the client for the expenses
associated with pursuing a claim."31 Thus, attorneys provide liquidity
27. Public Citizen argues as well that no evidence exists that total process costs are lower in
arbitration than in court. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 1, at 61.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 161-180.
30. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 270 (1998); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
624 (5th ed. 1998) ('The solution to this liquidity problem is the contingent fee contract."); see
infra text accompanying notes 190-191.
31. Kritzer, supra note 30, at 270.
[Vol. 59:3:729
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to finance their clients' litigation costs and share the risk of an
unsuccessful claim.
Arbitration costs are simply another form of expense-like
discovery costs, investigation costs, expert witness fees, and so on.
Given that lawyers are willing to finance and insure against these
other sorts of expenses, one would expect the same to be true for
arbitration costs. Indeed, anecdotal evidence indicates that at least
some contingent fee contracts include arbitration costs and
arbitrators' fees in the definition of "costs" that the attorneys will
advance. 32 To the extent lawyers do not treat arbitration costs the
same as other costs, it may well be due to cases like Morrison. So long
as attorneys can use the upfront costs of arbitration as a ground for
challenging an arbitration agreement (enabling their client to bring
his or her claim in court instead of in arbitration), attorneys have an
incentive not to finance arbitration costs.
In short, Public Citizen's contention-that arbitration costs
"severely restrict, or eliminate, the advantage a consumer has under
the contingency fee system"-has it exactly backwards. Arbitration
costs do not impair the functioning of the contingent fee system.
Rather, the contingent fee mechanism provides a means for
overcoming liquidity and risk aversion barriers to arbitration. As a
result, even accepting the premises of the cost-based criticism, it does
not follow that arbitration costs necessarily preclude individuals from
bringing their claims in arbitration. Even if individual claimants
cannot afford the forum costs of arbitration, at least some of those
individuals-those with economically viable claims given the total
costs of the dispute resolution process-should nonetheless be able to
bring their claims.
Part II provides an overview of the cost structure of arbitration.
Part III takes an in-depth look at current case law and legislation
dealing with arbitration costs as a ground for challenging the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, and reports the results of an
empirical study of 163 post-Green Tree federal court cases. Part IV
sets out the economic analysis, using both expected value and option
models of the decision whether to file a claim. Part V reexamines the
current case law in light of the economic analysis, suggesting
significant changes in the legal doctrine. Continuing the empirical
analysis, it also finds that in most reported cases, even those in which
courts invalidated the arbitration agreement on cost grounds,
arbitration costs do not appear to have been a barrier to asserting the
claim in arbitration.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
2006] 735
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II. THE COST STRUCTURE OF ARBITRATION (AS COMPARED TO
LITIGATION)
A party litigating or arbitrating a case faces three types of
costs: attorneys' fees, other litigation expenses, and forum costs.
33
First, assuming a party does not proceed pro se, the party must pay its
attorney. Consumers and employees often agree to pay their
attorneys on a contingent fee basis, which enables individuals to defer
payment until after the case is over (and avoid payment altogether
unless they prevail). Second, the party must pay other litigation
expenses, such as discovery costs, expert witness fees, and the like. It
appears to be common practice for attorneys to advance those
expenses on behalf of their contingent fee clients. 34 Third, the party
(at least the plaintiff or claimant) must pay forum costs-a filing fee in
court or the arbitrators' fees plus the fees charged by the institution (if
any) administering the arbitration.
No definitive empirical evidence exists comparing attorneys'
fees and other litigation costs incurred in litigation and arbitration.
35
But in many cases, forum costs are likely higher in arbitration than in
litigation. To file suit in federal court, a plaintiff must pay only a flat
filing fee of $250.36 The filing fee is the same regardless of the amount
at stake or the length of time the claim takes to resolve. Even that
filing fee may be waived by the court on a showing of financial
hardship. 37  The rest of the forum costs are subsidized by the
government.
38
By contrast, parties to arbitration proceedings ordinarily bear
the full costs of the process. Arbitration is not subsidized by the
government in the same way as the court system: "[i]t's a private
service provided on an individual basis and paid for case-by-case." 39
33. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 1, at 4-5. In addition, losses due to the time value
of money might also be classified as a cost (or benefit) of arbitration. See Matthew T. Bodie,
Questions About the Efficiency of Employment Arbitration Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1, 12
(2004) (explaining that supporters of arbitration argue that "an arbitral award might have a
higher expected value since it would be granted more quickly than a litigation award").
34. See infra text accompanying notes 190-191.
35. E.g., Herbert M. Kritzer & Jill K. Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative
Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration
Association and the Courts, 8 JUSTICE Sys. J. 6 (1983). Case selection effects make carrying out
such studies extremely difficult. See infra text accompanying notes 135-137.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006).
37. Id. § 1915(a)(1).
38. E.g., POSNER, supra note 30, at 639-40; Frank A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute
Resolution, 79 F.R.D. 76, 125-26 (1976).
39. CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Defenders and Proponents Square Off on New
Report, 20 ALT. TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIG. 91, 104 (2002) (quoting India Johnson, Vice
736 [Vol. 59:3:729
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The rest of this Part describes the fee structure for arbitrations
administered by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), which
is illustrative of the characteristics of arbitration fees generally. It
begins by looking at arbitrators' fees, then discusses the
administrative fees charged under the AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules, and concludes by examining low-cost arbitrations under the
AAA's Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Arbitrations.
40 Of
course, the parties need not use administrative services provided by
institutions such as the AAA. Instead, the arbitrators themselves may
handle the administrative duties. If so, presumably the arbitrators'
fees would increase to some extent (although it is uncertain whether
the increase would be more or less than the administrative fees
avoided).
Unlike litigation, in which the government pays the judge's
salary, the parties in arbitration must pay the arbitrators. The AAA
Commercial Rules do not establish a uniform fee for arbitrators but
permit the arbitrators to set their own fees.41 Table 1 summarizes
data collected by the AAA on arbitrators' fees, which reveal mean and
median arbitrators' fees in the sample of well over $1000 per day (and
up to $5000 per day for at least one commercial arbitrator).42
President, American Arbitration Association). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial
ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling
Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 297, 357-58 (1996) (arguing that private dispute
resolution is subsidized to some extent by the government).
40. For a comparison of the fees charged by the National Arbitration Forum and JAMS with
the AAA fee structure, see Budnitz, supra note 3, at 138-43.
41. See American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules, Rule R-51(a)
(effective Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 ("Arbitrators shall be
compensated at a rate consistent with the arbitrator's stated rate of compensation.") [hereinafter
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules]. By comparison, some international arbitration institutions
set out a schedule for arbitrators' fees based on the amount in dispute. See, e.g., International
Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, App. III,
Art. IV(B) (effective Jan. 1, 1998), available at http://www.jus.uio.nolmlicc.arbitration
.rules. 1998.
42. The sources for data in the table are the following: Affidavit of Frank Zotto 13,
Phillips v. Associates Home Equity, Case No. 01 CH 1944 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2001) (reporting
results of "random sampling of 60 arbitrators on the Commercial Panel in the Chicago, Illinois
area"); Affidavit of Frank Zotto 10, Pope v. AutoNation USA, Case No. A-0001609 (Ohio Ct.
Common Pleas Aug. 15, 2001) (reporting results of "sampling of 31 arbitrators on the
Commercial Panel in Hamilton County, Ohio"); Affidavit of Christine Newhall 6, Cowart v.
Credit Counselors Corp., Inc., Case No. IPOO-0701 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2001) (reporting on the
results of "random sampling of 26 arbitrators on the Commercial Panel in the State of Indiana");
Affidavit of Frank Zotto 9, Calvo v. PIA Merchandising Co., Case No. 2:00cv873 (E.D. Va. Oct.
4, 2001) (reporting results of "sampling of 15 arbitrators on the Employment Panel in the
Virginia, North Carolina, Washington, D.C. and Maryland area"); Affidavit of Frank Zotto 7(h),
Physicians Data, Inc. v. Quest Wireless, L.L.C., Case No. OOCV631 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 28,
2001) (reporting results of "random sampling of 38 arbitrators on the Commercial Panel in the
Denver, Colorado area"). All of the affidavits are included in the CD-ROM Appendix to NATIONAL
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Although the arbitrators earn their fees by doing work over the course
of the case, Rule R-52 of the AAA Rules permits the AAA to require
the parties to make a deposit prior to any hearing to cover anticipated
arbitrators' fees.43  As an alternative for low-income claimants,
according to the AAA, it has "thousands of arbitrators" on its panel
who are willing to serve for one hearing day on a pro bono basis.44 The
AAA indicates that it will seek to appoint an arbitrator who will serve
pro bono when the claimant qualifies for a waiver of the AAA's
administrative fees, as discussed below,45 and when arbitrators' fees
may preclude the claimant from bringing his or her case. A party may
request a pro bono arbitrator even if the AAA does not grant a fee
waiver. The AAA makes clear that it "cannot guarantee the
appointment of a pro bono or reduced rate arbitrator," but that it will
"make every effort to accommodate the request."46
Table 1. Arbitrators' Fees in AAA Arbitrations
AAA Panel Mean Median Range n
(per day) (per day) (per day)
Chicago, Commercial $1800 $1698 $750-$5000 60
IL
Colorado Commercial $1442 $1500 $600-$2500 38
Hamilton Commercial $1468 $1400 $600-$2100 31
County, OH
Indiana Commercial $1308 $1225 $700-$1800 26
VA, NC, MD, Employment $1403 $1500 $700-$2000 15
DC
In addition to the arbitrators' fees, the AAA charges
administrative fees "to compensate it for the cost of providing
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 6; see also Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 934 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (citing "average daily rate of arbitrator compensation in Northern California" as
$1899), affd in part and rev'd in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
43. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 41, Rule R-52.
44. American Arbitration Association, AAA Implements New Consumer Initiatives, Revises
Consumer Rules, www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21892 (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). Because more
complex cases are likely to have longer hearings, one would expect the availability of arbitrators
willing to serve pro bono would be more helpful to claimants with small claims than those with
large claims.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 54-58.
46. American Arbitration Association, Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono Arbitrators
Services, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22040 (last visited Apr. 30, 2006) [hereinafter AAA
Administrative Fee Waivers].
738 [Vol. 59:3:729
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administrative services." 47 Under the AAA's Commercial Arbitration
Rules, the administrative fees consist of a filing fee and what the AAA
calls a "case service fee,"48 both of which increase as the amount of the
claim increases. 49 Claimants (or counter-claimants) must advance the
filing fee at the time they file the claim.50 The case service fee is
payable when the first hearing in the case is scheduled, subject to
being refunded if no hearing takes place.51 Table 2 summarizes the
fee schedule under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules.52 As
discussed in more detail below, consumer claims are governed by the
AAA's Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes,
which alters the fees consumers pay (among other things).53
Table 2. Fee Schedule - AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules
Amount of Claim Initial Filing Fee Case Service
Fee
Above $0 to $10,000 $750 $200
Above $10,000 to $75,000 $950 $300
Above $75,000 to $150,000 $1800 $750
Above $150,000 to $300,000 $2750 $1250
Above $300,000 to $500,000 $4250 $1750
Above $500,000 to $1,000,000 $6000 $2500
Above $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 $8000 $3250
Above $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 $10,000 $4000




Nonmonetary Claims $3250 $1250
47. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 41, Rule R-49.
48. Id.
49. Putting aside access issues, charging fees that vary with the amount of the claim has
potential benefits for dispute resolution processes. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, A
Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 129 (2004) (noting
possible constraint on attorneys seeking to benefit from anchoring effects by claiming large
amounts of damages).
50. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 41, Rule R-4(a)(ii).
51. Id. ("Fees").
52. Id.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 63-70. Employee claims are dealt with under the
AAA's Employment Arbitration Rules, which contain similar provisions for low-cost arbitration
of small claims.
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Like the court system, the AAA Rules permit low-income
claimants to seek a waiver of the administrative fees. Rule R-49
provides that "[t]he AAA may, in the event of extreme hardship on the
part of any party, defer or reduce the administrative fees.
'54
According to the AAA, it will consider waiving or deferring its
administrative fee for parties whose gross annual income is below
200% of the federal poverty guidelines. 55  In addition to annual
income, the AAA may take into account past income, potential future
income, and assets in deciding whether to waive its fees.
56 All
claimants must file an affidavit of hardship when seeking a fee
waiver. The bottom line is that the determination is within the AAA's
discretion. As the AAA explains, "[s]ince every hardship request is
unique and involves many variables, the AAA reserves the right to
deny or grant any request based on the information given by the
requesting party."57  Note that even if the AAA waives its
administrative fees, the waiver does not include arbitrators' fees. It is
the arbitrators' decision whether to serve on a pro bono basis, as
discussed above.
58
Finally, under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, the
parties share the costs of arbitration equally (except for the expenses
of their own witnesses), unless they agree otherwise or "unless the
arbitrator in the award assesses such expenses or any part thereof
against any specified party or parties."59  The costs that may be
reallocated include "required travel and other expenses of the
arbitrator, AAA representatives, and any witness and the cost of proof
produced at the request of the arbitrator."60 Likewise, while claimants
must pay the AAA's administrative fees in advance, those fees are
"subject to final apportionment by the arbitrator in the award. ' 61
Thus, a successful claimant ultimately may be able to recover its
arbitration costs, but only at the discretion of the arbitrator at the end
of the proceeding. Some arbitration clauses override this default rule
and specify that the parties are to share arbitration costs equally
54. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 41, Rule R-49.
55. AAA Administrative Fee Waivers, supra note 46. Those amounts range from $17,180 for
a one-person family in the 48 contiguous United States and Washington D.C., to $74,380 for an
eight-person family in Alaska. Id.
56. Id. Although the potential proceeds from the claim involved in the arbitration might be
characterized either as potential future income or an asset of the claimant, there is no indication
that the AAA has used such an interpretation.
57. Id.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
59. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 41, Rule R-50.
60. Id.
61. Id. Rule R-49.
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without regard to the arbitrators' usual power to reallocate those costs
in the award.
62
The discussion so far has focused on the AAA's Commercial
Arbitration Rules. But for arbitration agreements in standard form
contracts between businesses and consumers, the AAA supplements
the Commercial Arbitration Rules with its Supplementary Procedures
for Consumer-Related Disputes.63 The AAA's Consumer Procedures
treat costs differently than its Commercial Arbitration Rules in
several respects.
64
First, the Consumer Procedures cap arbitrators' fees for small
claims, that is, "cases in which no claim exceeds $75,000."65 For a
desk arbitration (i.e., an arbitration based solely on the parties' paper
submissions with no oral hearing), the arbitrator is paid $250. For a
telephone hearing, the arbitrator is to receive $750 per day. For
claims over $75,000, arbitrators continue to be compensated at their
standard rate.6
6
Second, for small claims, the consumer and the business share
the arbitrator's fees. For claims less than $10,000, the consumer must
pay one-half of the arbitrator's fee, but no more than $125. For claims
between $10,000 and $75,000, the consumer must pay one-half of the
arbitrator's fee, but no more than $375. For claims over $75,000, the
consumer must make a deposit of one-half the arbitrator's fee. 67 In all
cases, the business is to pay the remainder of the arbitrator's fee to
the extent not paid by the consumer. 68
Third, for small claims, the consumer pays no administrative
fee. 69 Instead, the business is responsible for all administrative fees.
62. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
55, 70-71 (2004) (various consumer contracts); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 735-36 (franchise agreements).
63. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related
Disputes, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (last visited Apr. 30, 2006) [hereinafter AAA
Consumer Procedures]. More precisely, the AAA Consumer Procedures apply to any "agreement
between a consumer and a business where the business has a standardized, systematic
application of arbitration clauses with customers and where the terms and conditions of the
purchase of standardized, consumable goods or services are non-negotiable or primarily non-
negotiable in most or all of its terms, conditions, features, or choices," and when the product or
service involved is "for personal or household use." Id. Rule C-l(a).
64. The Consumer Procedures differ in a number of ways other than costs from the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules, but those differences are not relevant here.
65. AAA Consumer Procedures, supra note 63, Rule C-8 ("Arbitrator Fees").
66. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
67. AAA Consumer Procedures, supra note 63, Rule C-8 ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by
the Consumer").
68. Id. ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by the Business").
69. Id. ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by the Consumer").
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As set out in the Consumer Procedures, for claims under $10,000, the
business must pay an administrative fee of $750 and, if the case goes
to hearing, a Case Service Fee of $200. For claims between $10,000
and $75,000, the administrative fee is $950 and the Case Service Fee
in the event of a hearing is $300. Only for claims over $75,000 is the
consumer responsible for paying administrative fees, determined
under the AAA Commercial Rules as described above.
70
In short, the forum costs faced by consumers under the AAA
Consumer Procedures for small claims are similar to the forum costs
they would face in court. Other arbitration institutions likewise have
instituted low-cost arbitration schemes for consumer claims. 71 Thus,
concerns about upfront costs precluding claimants from asserting
claims in arbitration, at present, seem limited to claims over $75,000
(in institutional arbitrations) and to claims in arbitrations not
administered by an arbitration institution with a low-cost arbitration
scheme.
III. COSTS AS A GROUND FOR CHALLENGING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
Claimants commonly rely on the upfront costs of arbitration as
a ground for challenging the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
The legal theories used are twofold. The first theory, applicable to
cases in which a claimant seeks to assert a federal statutory claim, is
that the upfront costs of arbitration prevent the claimant from
vindicating his or her federal statutory rights.72 The second theory,
more generally applicable, is that arbitration agreements with high
upfront costs are unconscionable.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 41-62.
71. E.g., NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE, "FEE SCHEDULE" (effective
Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.arb-forum.comlprograms/code-new/2005-fees.pdf. In
addition, Rule 44(G) of the NAF Code of Procedure sets out a process whereby a consumer "who
asserts that arbitration fees prevent the Consumer Party from effectively vindicating the
Consumer's case in arbitration may ... prior to paying any filing fee" request the arbitrator to
require "another Party or Parties [to] pay all or part of the arbitration fees" or declare the
arbitration agreement "unenforceable." Id. Rule 44(G), available at http://www.arb-
forum.comlprograms/code-new/2005_code.pdf. "If there is no agreement by the Parties," the
arbitrator is directed to resolve the request "based on the applicable law." Id.
72. Claimants sometimes make an analogous challenge based on a state law cause of action,
asserting that an arbitration agreement is invalid because it precludes claimants from
vindicating their state statutory rights. So long as the Federal Arbitration Act applies to the
arbitration agreement (i.e., it is within the scope of Congress's Commerce power) such an
argument likely is preempted by federal law. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements - with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and
Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 270-72 (2006).
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Although the theories differ, the underlying analysis is similar.
Courts first compare the upfront costs of arbitration to the (usually
lower) upfront costs of litigation and then evaluate whether the
claimant can afford to pay the additional costs based on his or her
assets and income. 73 Thus, courts typically take an ex post rather
than an ex ante approach to cost-based challenges: they do not look at
the claimant's financial situation at the time the contract was entered
into, but rather his or her financial situation at the time the claim is
filed.7 4 The burden is on the claimant to show both the expected costs
of arbitration and that those costs are likely to preclude him or her
from asserting the claim. If the claimant carries that burden, the
court will invalidate the arbitration agreement in whole or in part.
75
Cost-based challenges to arbitration agreements are frequently raised
but rarely successful-although the rate of success varies widely across
the circuits.
In addition to court challenges, several state legislatures have
adopted statutes that regulate arbitration costs. The legal effect of
such legislation has not yet been widely tested. Federal statutes
addressing arbitration costs have been introduced in the U.S.
Congress but have not yet been enacted.
A. Court Challenges: "Vindication-of-Statutory-Rights" Theory76
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that
claims arising under federal statutes can be arbitrated based on the
assumption that claimants are not giving up their legal rights by
73. A preliminary legal question is whether a court even can make such determinations, or
whether they are matters for the arbitrator. Given the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Green
Thee Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); PacificCare Health Systems v. Book, 538 U.S.
401 (2003); and Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002), the question is an
interesting one, but is beyond the scope of this paper. For a case that considers the question, see
Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, 425 F.3d 1012, 1019 (6th Cir. 2005).
74. For one exception, see Pro Tech Indus., Inc. v. URS Corp., 377 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir.
2004) ("Under Texas law, we only consider the circumstances at contract formation to determine
if a contract is unconscionable, rendering Pro Tech's current inability to afford the costs of
arbitration irrelevant to the conscionability determination."). Cf. Ware, supra note 72, at 267-68
(stating that in applying unconscionability doctrine to arbitration clauses, "a court should assess
the 'values exchanged' as of the time the contract was formed, rather than as of a later time,
such as the time of a dispute").
75. This description is an overgeneralization; the approaches taken by the courts differ to
some degree, as described in more detail in the following sections. But with only limited
exceptions, it is clear that the claimant must show that cost precludes him or her from
vindicating statutory rights, not merely that the claimant is worse off in arbitration than in
litigation.
76. See Budnitz, supra note 3, at 157.
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going to arbitration. 77 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,78
for example, the Court explained that "so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum," the federal statute (there the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act) would continue to serve its purpose. 79 Implicit in
the Court's statement is that if, for some reason, a claimant may not
"effectively.. . vindicate" his or her statutory rights in arbitration, the
federal statutory claim may be resolved in court.80 One such reason
asserted by claimants is cost. This Part first discusses the Green Tree
case (the governing Supreme Court precedent)81 and then examines
how the circuits have dealt with cost-based challenges since Green
Tree.
1. Green Tree
In the leading case, Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph,82 the Supreme Court rejected a cost-based challenge to a
consumer arbitration agreement. 83 The claimant in Green Tree,
Larketta Randolph, financed her purchase of a mobile home through a
loan from Green Tree Financial Corporation. Included in her contract
with Green Tree was an arbitration clause that neither contained any
provision addressing the costs of arbitration nor specified a governing
set of institutional arbitration rules.84
77. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953)); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974).
78. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
79. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985)).
80. The theory seems to be that if a prospective waiver of statutory rights would be invalid,
an arbitration clause that has the effect of a prospective waiver of statutory rights also should be
invalid.
81. Actually, the Supreme Court has decided two Green Tree cases: Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), and Green Tree Financial Corp, v. Bazzle, 539
U.S. 444 (2003). The earlier case (Randolph) typically is known as "Green Tree," while the later
case is known as "Bazzle."
82. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). Prior to Green Tree, the leading court of appeals case was Cole v.
Burns International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which construed an
assertedly ambiguous arbitration clause to require the employer to pay all arbitration costs.
83. Also at issue in Green Tee was whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review
the district court's order under 9 U.S.C. § 16. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals'
exercise of appellate jurisdiction was proper. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 89 (2000).
84. The language of the arbitration clause, which is problematic in other respects, is in
relevant part as follows:
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Randolph thereafter filed a class action in federal court against
Green Tree asserting that Green Tree violated the Truth in Lending
Act ("TILA")85 by failing to include the cost of required insurance as a
finance charge.8 6 Randolph sought to recover statutory damages
(equal to twice the finance charge on the loan87) and attorneys' fees,
for herself and on behalf of a class of similarly situated borrowers.
88
The district court granted Green Tree's motion to compel
arbitration, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 9 The court of appeals
focused on the fact that the arbitration agreement was completely
silent as to costs. Nothing in the agreement addressed how much
arbitration would cost or who would bear those costs. Nor did the
arbitration agreement specify a set of rules, such as those
promulgated by the AAA, 90 that contained provisions on arbitration
costs. Although Randolph presented some limited evidence on
possible arbitration costs in her rehearing petition before the district
All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the
relationships which result from this Contract or the validity of this arbitration clause
or the entire contract, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator
selected by Assignee with the consent of Buyer(s). This arbitration Contract is made
pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. Section 1. Judgment upon the award may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction. The parties agree and understand that they
choose arbitration instead of litigation to resolve disputes. The parties understand
that they have a right or opportunity to litigate disputes through a court, but that
they prefer to resolve their disputes through arbitration. THE PARTIES
VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY
TRIAL EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR
PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY ASSIGNEE (AS PROVIDED HEREIN). The
parties agree and understand that all disputes arising under case law, statutory law,
and all other laws, including, but not limited to, contract, tort, and property disputes
will be subject to binding arbitration in accord with this Contract. The parties agree
and understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and the
Contract.
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 83 n.1 (2000). One problem with the
clause is its language on arbitrator selection, which provides that Green Tree shall select the
arbitrator "with the consent of Buyer(s)." An important element of arbitration is that the
arbitrator be neutral, with both sides involved in selection. In Harris v. Green Tree Financial
Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit rejected a challenge to the enforceability of
the clause on the basis of the arbitrator selection language. Id. at 183-84.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2006).
86. Green Tree required Randolph to buy Vender's Single Interest insurance, which
provided coverage for its expenses in the event Randolph defaulted on the loan. Green Tree, 531
U.S. at 82.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006).
88. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
89. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999) (reversing Randolph
v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1997)).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 40-70.
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court, 91 the court of appeals did not rely on that evidence. Instead, the
court concluded that because the agreement was silent on the costs of
arbitration, Randolph faced a risk that arbitration costs would
preclude her from vindicating her statutory rights.92 On the basis of
that risk, the court invalidated the arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 93 and reversed. It began
(after reciting as background its cases dealing with the arbitrability of
federal statutory claims) by acknowledging that "[i]t may well be that
the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such
as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights
in the arbitral forum."94 But it concluded that there was no evidence
in the record that Randolph would bear prohibitive arbitration costs.
Indeed, the Court stated, the record "contains hardly any information
on the matter."95 In a footnote, the Court recited the limited evidence
(an estimate of the AAA filing fee of $500 for claims in the amount of
that brought by Randolph and an article reciting average arbitrators'
fees of $700 per day96) and dismissed those estimates as based
"entirely on unfounded assumptions"-that the AAA would administer
her arbitration and that, if it did, it would charge her the fees she
indicated. According to the Court, "[t]hese unsupported statements
provide no basis on which to ascertain the actual costs and fees to
which she would be subject in arbitration."97  Similarly, the Court
found the Eleventh Circuit's rationale for invalidating the arbitration
agreement-the agreement's silence on the matter of costs-"plainly
insufficient to render [the arbitration agreement] unenforceable."98
Thus, the Court's holding essentially is a negative one: that an
arbitration agreement is silent on costs is not a sufficient basis on
which to invalidate the agreement. As such, Green Tree provides little
guidance on what sort of showing is needed for a court to invalidate an
arbitration agreement on cost grounds. The Court did state that the
claimant challenging the arbitration agreement "bears the burden of
91. As described by the Supreme Court, that evidence consisted of (1) a statement that the
filing fee for AAA arbitration for claims under $10,000 would be $500 (not including arbitrators'
fees or administrative fees); and (2) an article quoting an AAA executive that arbitrators' fees
averaged $700 per day. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 n.6 (2000).
92. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1158 (11th Cir. 1999).
93. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 529 U.S. 1052 (2000).
94. 531 U.S. at 90.
95. Id.
96. Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Lawyers at ABA Session Debate Role of American
Arbitration Association, DAILY LABOR REPORT, Feb. 15, 1996 (cited in Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 n.6 (2000)).
97. 531 U.S. at 90 n.6.
98. Id. at 91.
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showing the likelihood" that he or she will incur prohibitive
arbitration costs.9 9 But the Court gave no indication "[h]ow detailed
the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking
arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence."'100
2. The Circuits after Green Tree
Since Green Tree, the circuits have taken differing approaches
to determining what sort of showing the claimant must make to carry
its burden. 1 1 Virtually every circuit to have addressed the question
99. Id. at 92.
100. Id.
101. The courts of appeals also appear to differ as to several other issues that arise in cost-
based challenges. First, there appears to be some difference among the circuits as to the proper
timing of the challenge. The circuits all seemingly permit claimants to challenge the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement in court prior to the arbitration proceeding. See infra
App. A. The Eleventh Circuit, however, while apparently willing to consider such challenges, has
suggested that such challenges are unlikely to prevail because the claimant can challenge the
arbitration award after it is made. See Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2003) (refusing to remand a cost-based challenge to the district court for further evidentiary
development, concluding that "there is no record that could be made at this point" because the
agreement permitted the prevailing party to recover the costs of arbitration, and if the claimant
prevails "he will incur no fees at all.... In this event, obviously, he will not have been deprived
of any statutory right or remedy by the mandatory arbitration"); see also Summers v. Dillards,
Inc., 351 F.3d 1100, 1101 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing a district court decision invalidating
arbitration agreement on cost grounds as "too speculative"; "It is unclear at this time which
party may prevail at arbitration and Summers may seek judicial review of an award if she feels
that her available remedies were hindered."). By contrast, the en banc Sixth Circuit in Morrison
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), expressly rejected the
adequacy of post-award challenges. Id. at 662 (contending that claimant would be in a "Catch-22"
because the fact that claimant obtained an arbitration award might be used to demonstrate that
cost did not deter him or her from arbitrating the statutory claims).
Second, the circuits differ as to the effect of a post-dispute offer by the respondent to pay all
arbitration costs. Such offers are common in the reported cases. See infra App. A (in 42 out of the
163 federal court cases studied, the court stated that the respondent had offered to pay the
claimant's arbitration costs after a dispute arose). The courts are split on the relevance of such
an offer-when it is rejected by the claimant-to the cost-based challenge. The Sixth Circuit in
Morrison held that the respondent's offer should be disregarded, reasoning that "[blecause the
employer drafted the arbitration agreement, the employer is saddled with the consequences of
the provision as drafted." 317 F. 3d at 677 (emphasis in original). A number of other courts,
however, have concluded that such an offer effectively moots the cost-based challenge,
presumably because arbitration costs cannot preclude a claimant from vindicating statutory
rights when the claimant does not have to pay any costs. E.g., Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing
Co., 292 F.3d 49, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2002).
Third, the circuits differ as to the consequences of a successful challenge (although the
differences may be due at least in part to differences among the challenged arbitration clauses).
See Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Decisions striking an
arbitration clause entirely often involved agreements without a severability clause ... or
agreements that did not contain merely one readily severable illegal provision, but were instead
pervasively infected with illegality .... Decisions severing an illegal provision and compelling
arbitration, on the other hand, typically considered agreements with a severability clause and
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since Green Tree has adopted a case-by-case approach to cost-based
challenges. 10 2 But the specifics of the case-by-case approaches vary
among the circuits. 0 3 Comparing the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc.10 4 with the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Morrison10 5 illustrates the point.
The Fourth Circuit in Bradford was the first court of appeals
after Green Tree to address the question of the showing required of
claimants. The claimant, John Bradford, filed a demand for
arbitration before going to court, asserting identical age
discrimination and breach of contract claims in both arbitration and
court. The arbitration hearing occurred (with Bradford presenting
witnesses) prior to the district court's rejection of Bradford's argument
discrete unenforceable provisions.") (Roberts, J.). In some cases, courts have held the cost
provision severable from the arbitration clause, thus directing the parties to arbitrate while
imposing the arbitration costs on the respondent. E.g., Spinetti v. Service Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d
212, 219-23 (3d Cir. 2003). In other cases, the courts have held the cost provision not severable
and invalidated the arbitration agreement in its entirety. E.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int'l., L.P.,
341 F.3d 256, 271 (3d Cir. 2003). Such a result is more common when the claimant challenges
the enforceability of other provisions of the arbitration agreement as well, such as a provision
limiting the damages that can be recovered in arbitration. A third alternative would be to direct
the parties to arbitrate all claims but the federal statutory claim at issue in the case. This
alternative draws on the doctrinal basis for the vindication-of-statutory rights theory in the first
place-that Congress intended to permit arbitration of federal statutory claims so long as the
individual could vindicate his or her statutory rights in the arbitral forum. If the costs preclude
the claimant from effectively vindicating federal statutory rights, then those claims-but not any
others-should be resolved in court. Cf. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217
(1985) (holding that when claimant files suit raising both arbitrable claims and nonarbitrable
claims, "the Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable
claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the
possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums"). Few if any courts
seem to take this third approach, although the D.C. Circuit has relied on this reasoning to reject
cost-based challenges in cases not raising federal claims. See Brown v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 257
F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
102. E.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir.
2003) ("Since Green Tree, all but one of the other Circuits that have reconsidered this issue have
applied a similar case-by-case approach."). The Musnick court cites the Ninth Circuit as adopting
a per se rule. See id. at 1259 n.3 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th
Cir. 2002) (stating that a clause providing for the sharing of arbitration costs between claimants
and respondents "alone would render an arbitration agreement unenforceable")). The Ninth
Circuit's decisions, in Adams and other cases, are based on state law unconscionability grounds
rather than a vindication-of-statutory-rights theory. Id.; see also A1-Safin v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 2005) (Washington law); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
328 F.3d 1165, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2003) (California law); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th
Cir. 2002) (California law). See generally infra text accompanying notes 104-116.
103. See, e.g., Budnitz, supra note 3, at 154 ("Courts are split over what type of showing is
required to prove that costs are so high as to bar access to justice. Interpretations of what Green
Tree requires focus on three factors: the financial condition of the claimant, the absolute cost of
arbitration, and the relative cost of arbitration when compared to court proceedings.").
104. 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
105. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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that a fee-sharing provision in the arbitration agreement (i.e., a
provision that required the parties to "share equally the fees and costs
of the arbitrator") prevented him from vindicating his statutory rights
in arbitration. In affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth
Circuit set out a "case-by case analysis" focusing on three factors: (1)
"the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs"; (2) "the
expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation"; and (3)
"whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the
bringing of claims."10 6 On the facts of the case, the Fourth Circuit
rejected the cost-based challenge, in large part because Bradford was
not in fact deterred from arbitrating his claim.
10 7
The Sixth Circuit in Morrison expressly rejected the Fourth
Circuit's approach, adopting a more favorable standard for claimants.
The Sixth Circuit cited two failings of the Bradford approach. First, it
"asks too much" of claimants "to come forward with concrete estimates
of anticipated or expected costs of arbitration" at an early phase of the
case.108  Second, it focuses solely on the individual bringing the
challenge rather than "other similarly situated individuals" who also
might be deterred by upfront arbitration costs.10 9 The Sixth Circuit
described its "revised case-by-case approach" as requiring claimants
"to demonstrate that the potential costs of arbitration are great
enough to deter them and similarly situated individuals from seeking
to vindicate their federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum."110
One key difference, as identified by the court, is that under Morrison
the Sixth Circuit will look to the circumstances of potential claimants
"similarly situated" to the claimant raising the cost challenge. Thus, a
court should take the claimant's personal financial resources "as
representative of this larger class's ability to shoulder the costs of
arbitration."1 '1  Moreover, the claimant need not show the actual
arbitration costs he or she is likely to incur in this particular case;
instead, evidence of "average or typical arbitration costs" is enough.
112
Nor should the court consider the possibility of the arbitrator
awarding the claimant his or her arbitration costs in the final award
because claimants are risk averse ("inclined to err on the side of
106. 238 F.3d at 556. The court of appeals noted that "parties to litigation in court often face
costs that are not typically found in arbitration, such as the cost of longer proceedings and more
complicated appeals on the merits." Id. at 556 n.5.
107. Id. at 558.
108. 317 F.3d at 660.
109. Id. at 661.
110. Id. at 663.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 664.
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caution," in the Sixth Circuit's words).'1 3 According to the Morrison
court, for low-level employees, "this standard will render cost-splitting
provisions unenforceable in many, if not most, cases.""
14
Central to the Sixth Circuit's analysis was its view of
contingent fee contracts. According to the court of appeals, most
employees with federal statutory claims (particularly Title VII claims)
are represented by counsel on a contingent fee basis. As a result,
"many litigants will face minimal costs in the judicial forum, as the
attorney will cover most of the fees of litigation and advance the
expenses incurred in discovery." 115 But in arbitration, according to the
court, claimants must pay arbitrators' fees and administrative costs,
expenses "which are never incurred in the judicial forum." 116  The
court never considered the possibility that the attorney would advance
those costs as well, just like the other litigation expenses in court.
Indeed, even under the Fourth Circuit's approach, as noted above, a
key factor is "the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and
costs," which does not seem to consider the possibility that costs may
be advanced by the attorney.
B. Court Challenges: Unconscionability
In addition to a vindication-of-statutory-rights theory,
claimants also raise cost-based challenges to the enforceability of
arbitration agreements under the doctrine of unconscionability.
117
Unconscionability is the principal theory for challenging arbitration
agreements on cost grounds in state court" 8 but is relied upon in
federal court cases as well." 9 Although derived from a different
113. Id. at 665.
114. Id. By contrast, "[lit will find, in many cases, that high-level managerial employees and
others with substantial means can afford the costs of arbitration, thus making cost-splitting
provisions in such cases enforceable." Id.
115. Id. at 664.
116. Id.
117. See infra App. A.
118. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000)
(holding an arbitration agreement unconscionable); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S. 2d
569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding an arbitration agreement unconscionable on cost grounds but
remanding based on substitution of alternative institutional rules).
119. Section 2 of the FAA makes arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §
2 (2006). Courts look to general contract defenses under state law for evaluating the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
944 (1995). Unconscionability is one of the most commonly asserted such defenses. See, e.g.,
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,
52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 195-98 (2004) (highlighting the resurgence in successful assertion of
unconscionability claims against enforcement of arbitration agreements); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
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doctrinal source, the analysis is very similar to that under the
vindication-of-statutory rights theory.120
This theory was advanced in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
121
decided by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. A
computer user filed a class action against Gateway 2000, Inc. alleging
claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud, and unfair
trade practices due to Gateway's alleged failure to provide promised
service for computers it sold. Gateway sought to compel arbitration,
relying on an arbitration clause in its Standard Forms and
Conditions 122 that provided for arbitration under the Rules of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC").
123
According to the court, "a claim of less than $50,000 required advance
fees of $4,000 (more than the cost of most Gateway products)." 124 The
court held the cost provision unconscionable, reasoning that "the
excessive cost factor that is necessarily entailed in arbitrating before
the ICC is unreasonable and surely serves to deter the individual
consumer from invoking the process."'125  Based on Gateway's
willingness to arbitrate before the AAA rather than the ICC, however,
the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether
the AAA's costs of arbitration were so excessive as to be
unconscionable.
More recent is the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Ferguson v.
Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc.,' 26 one in a line of cost-based
unconscionability challenges adjudicated in the Ninth Circuit.127 The
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 799-803 (2004)
(same).
120. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 6, § 5.4.1, at 113:
If high fees are assessed to arbitrate a federal claim, the consumer can argue both
that the fees conflict with the federal statute and that they make the clause
unconscionable. If high fees are assessed to arbitrate a state statutory claim, however,
the consumer should rely on an unconscionability argument or another argument that
would apply to any contract term, such as the argument that the term is
unenforceable as against public policy.
121. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
122. Gateway was the defendant in a series of cases involving challenges to the
enforceability of the arbitration clause in the Gateway Standard Terms and Conditions. E.g., Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997); Klocek v.
Gateway, Inc. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No.
16913, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54 (Del. Ch. March 16, 2000). Brower is unusual among those cases
in the court's reliance on the doctrine of unconscionability. 676 N.Y.S.2d at 252-55.
123. International Chamber of Commerce, supra note 41, App. III.
124. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
125. Id. at 574.
126. 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002).
127. E.g., Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2005); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d
20061
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claimant filed suit against her employer, Countrywide, alleging
various claims, including a claim for sexual harassment under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.128 The district court refused to
compel arbitration, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Relying on
California law, particularly the California Supreme Court's decision in
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,129 the court
of appeals concluded that the arbitration clause was unconscionable.
The arbitration clause contained three provisions the court found
objectionable: the clause (1) excluded certain claims from arbitration;
(2) provided that the parties would share all arbitration costs (other
than the $125 initial filing fee, which the claimant would pay, and the
fee for the first day of any hearing, which the employer would pay);
and (3) imposed more stringent limitations on the employee's
discovery of the employer than on the employer's discovery of the
employee. Applying California law, the Ninth Circuit held all three
provisions unconscionable and, finding them not severable,
invalidated the entire arbitration clause. The court stated in dicta
that "the only valid fee provision is one in which an employee is not
required to bear any expense beyond what would be required to bring
the action in court."130 Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have echoed
this language in striking down arbitration agreements as
unconscionable, at least in part, on cost grounds. 131
C. An Empirical Study of Cost-Based Challenges in Federal Court
While the previous Sections examined particular cases, this
Section takes a more general perspective, summarizing some key
characteristics of the reported 32 federal court decisions adjudicating
cost-based challenges to arbitration agreements from December 11,
2000, to June 30, 2005.133 The Supreme Court decided Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph on December 11, 2000,134 so
the cases studied are limited to post-Green Tree decisions. Included
1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002). Most of the decisions are based on California law and at
least purport to rely on Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000), the leading California Supreme Court case.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2a, 2000e-3 & 1981a(c) (2006).
129. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
130. 298 F.3d at 786.
131. See supra note 127.
132. I include the decision so long as it is available on LEXIS, even if the opinion is formally
unpublished by the court.
133. Other results are reported in Part V.B. The cases are listed infra in Appendix A.
134. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
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are both court of appeals decisions and district court decisions,
although the description of the results below sometimes distinguishes
the two. Each case is included only once, either at the district court
level or at the court of appeals level. If, for example, the court of
appeals reversed the district court's decision on the cost issue, only the
court of appeals' decision is included, and the case is characterized
accordingly.
One important caveat needs to be noted: reported court cases
are subject to various selection biases making generalizing from the
results problematic. First, the sample of cases arising under
arbitration clauses is affected by "ex ante selection"-selection due to
parties deciding whether to agree to pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.13 5  Second, selection occurs when claimants decide
whether to assert their claims in arbitration. This sort of "ex post
selection" bias may be particularly problematic here, where the cases
in which arbitration costs preclude a party from asserting his or her
claim might be precisely those that never make it to court. Third, the
parties-either the plaintiff by filing suit or the defendant by removing
the case-select between federal court and state court. Fourth,
selection occurs when the parties settle their dispute prior to the
resolution of any challenge to the arbitration agreement. 136 As Joel
Waldfogel said: "any model of the settlement decision is also at least
implicitly a model of the selection of cases for trial."'1 7 Fifth, judges
select among cases when they identify the cases in which to issue
written opinions and designate those opinions as published or
unpublished. Moreover, the facts of the cases, and particularly the
evidence introduced by claimants to show their inability to pay
135. Christopher R. Drahozal, Ex Ante Selection of Disputes for Litigation (Feburary 27,
2004) (Working Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract jid=510162.
136. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1984) (describing case selection by settlement). For additional studies of
case selection by settlement, see Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Daniel Kessler et al.,
Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of
Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 235 (1996); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis
and the Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 93 (1995); Peter
Siegelman & John J. Donahue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for
Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
427 (1996); Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185
(1985); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22
J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (1993); Luke Froeb, The Adverse Selection of Cases for Trial, 13 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 317, 317 (1993); Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the
Trial/Settlement Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 17 (David
A. Anderson ed., 1996).
137. Joel Waldfogel, Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 419, 419 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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arbitration costs, vary by case. There is no reason to assume that the
different courts are dealing with comparable cases. Accordingly, the
results below are presented simply as descriptive of the reported
cases.
Federal courts issued opinions in 163 cases involving cost-
based challenges to arbitration agreements during the roughly four-
and-one-half-year period studied. Of those cases, 31 (19%) gave rise to
an opinion in the court of appeals, while the other 132 (81%) were
resolved by a district court with no evidence of an appeal on the cost
issue.138 Not surprisingly, given that the cases were brought in
federal court, the most common theory discussed in the opinions was
the vindication-of-statutory-rights theory, relying on Green Tree: 85
(52.1%) of the opinions addressed only the vindication-of-rights theory,
while another 11 (6.7%) discussed that theory along with another. In
65 cases (39.9%), the court addressed unconscionability as the sole
doctrinal basis for the cost-based challenge. 139 In many of those cases,
the argument that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable
closely tracked the vindication-of-rights theory and included a citation
to Green Tree.
Many of the cases involved employees suing their employer (or former
employer): 81 of 163 (or 49.7%) were employment cases. Most of the
rest (47 of 163, or 28.8%) involved consumer borrowers suing lenders
(banks, credit card issuers, etc.). 140 The substantial majority of the
cases (121 of 163, or 74.2%) were brought by individuals suing on their
own behalf, while the remainder (42 of 163, or 25.8%) were filed on a
class basis. 141 The distribution of class versus individual relief by type
of claimant (consumer versus employee) is summarized in Table 3.
138. In a handful of cases, the court of appeals issued an opinion that did not address the
cost issue. In such cases, the district court opinion is used rather than the court of appeals'
opinion.
139. Two courts described the cost-based challenge as based on public policy.
140. Other consumer claims were against companies such as debt collectors, brokerage firms,
home builders, mobile home manufacturers, telephone companies, insurers, a payment service
provider, and a fast food restaurant chain.
141. Because the motion to compel arbitration was resolved before a class was certified, it is
not possible to determine whether a class would have been certified. Thus, in characterizing
these cases I rely solely on whether the claimant sought to proceed on a class basis.
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Table 3. Cost-Based Challenges in Individual and Class
Actions





*One claim involved an employee suing an insurer
A large proportion of claimants asserted at least one federal
statutory claim, again not surprising given that the cases were in
federal court. The most common claims asserted were Title VII
employment discrimination claims (44 of 163, or 27%) and claims
under the Truth in Lending Act (31 of 163, or 19%). Other federal
statutory claims asserted by claimants (in cases in which they did not
raise a Title VII or TILA claim 142) included claims under the federal
antitrust laws, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA"). In 37 of 163 cases (or 22.3%), the claimant
apparently did not assert any claim based on federal law.
Overall, the vast majority of cost-based challenges to
arbitration agreements were unsuccessful. Of the 163 cases studied,
courts rejected the challenge and upheld the arbitration clause in 122
(or 74.8%). The success rate varied significantly by circuit. Claimants
in courts in the First, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits never
successfully challenged an arbitration agreement on cost grounds after
Green Tree, while claimants in courts in the Ninth Circuit succeeded
in having the clause invalidated in whole, or in part, in 12 of 20 cases
(or 60%). 143 Table 4 summarizes the outcomes by circuit, breaking
down the outcomes between courts of appeals and district courts.
142. I did not attempt a comprehensive cataloguing of the types of claims asserted by
claimants. Thus, so long as the claimant asserted either a Title VII claim or a TILA claim I saw
no reason to examine the case further. Only in cases in which the claimant did not assert either a
Title VII claim or a TILA claim did I collect information on what other federal law claim the
claimant alleged, if any. Likewise, only if the claimant did not assert a federal law claim did I
make note of what sort of state law claim the claimant asserted.
143. Once again I emphasize that this differential does not necessarily reflect differences in
approaches by the courts. Instead, it may merely reflect cases with different factual records
being decided by the courts.
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Table 4. Outcomes in Cost-Based Challeng s by Circuit
Clause Upheld Struck Down Provision Case
Severed Remanded Total
First Circuit 4 0 0 0
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 4
Court of Appeals 1 0 0 0 1
District Court 3 0 0 - 3
Second Circuit 13 1 0 0
(92.9%) (7.1%) (0%) (0%) 14
Court of Appeals 0 0 0 0 0
District Court 13 1 0 - 14
Third Circuit 16 3 2 2
(69.6%) (13%) (8.7%) (8.7%) 23
Court of Appeals 2 1 1 2 6
District Court 14 2 1 - 17
Fourth Circuit 6 1 0 0
(85.7%) (14.3%) (0%) (0%) 7
Court of Appeals 3 0 0 0 3
District Court 3 1 0 - 4
Fifth Circuit 17 0 0 0
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 17
Court of Appeals 3 0 0 0 3
District Court 14 0 0 - 14
Sixth Circuit 9 0 6 2
(52.9%) (0%) (35.3%) (11.8%) 17
Court of Appeals 0 0 1 2 3
District Court 9 0 5 - 14
Seventh Circuit 16 4 0 1
(80%) (20%) (0%) (0%) 20
Court of Appeals 1 0 0 1 1
District Court 15 4 0 - 19
Eighth Circuit 4 1 2 1
(50%) (12.5%) (25%) (12.5%) 8
Court of Appeals 2 0 0 1 3
District Court 2 1 2 0 5
Ninth Circuit 8 11 1 0
(40%) (55%) (5%) (0%) 20
Court of Appeals 0 5 1 0 6
District Court 8 6 0 - 14
Tenth Circuit 6 4 0 0
(60%) (40%) (0%) (0%) 10
Court of Appeals 0 0 0 0 0
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District Court* 6 4 0 - 10
Eleventh Circuit 19 0 0 0
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 19
Court of Appeals 4 0 0 0 4
District Court 15 0 0 0 15
D.C. Circuit 4 0 0 0
(100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) 4
Court of Appeals 1 0 0 0 1
District Court 3 0 0 0 3
122 25 11 5
Totals (74.8%) (15.3%) (6.7%) (3.1%) 163
Court of Appeals 17 6 3 5 31
District Court 105 19 8 - 132
* Includes one Bankruptcy Court opinion
D. Legislation
In addition to the courts, several state legislatures have
enacted statutes seeking to regulate arbitration costs. As part of a
series of laws regulating consumer arbitration enacted in 2002,144 the
California legislature enacted what is now Section 1284.3 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure. 145 Section 1284.3 regulates in
various ways the costs and fees that can be charged to a consumer by
a "private arbitration company," including arbitration institutions
such as the AAA. Subsection (a) prohibits a private arbitration
company or neutral arbitrator from administering a consumer
arbitration under an agreement that provides for costs to be shifted to
the consumer in the event the consumer loses in the arbitration. 146
Subsection (b) requires a private arbitration company to waive "[a]ll
fees and costs charged to or assessed upon a consumer party...
exclusive of arbitrator fees" for an "indigent consumer," which the
statute defines as "a person having a gross monthly income that is less
than 300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines."'147 The arbitration
institution must provide written notice of the availability of this
option to consumers, and the only evidence it can require in support of
144. See Ruth V. Glick, California Arbitration Reform: The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 119,
120-23 (2003) (describing legislation).
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3 (2006).
146. Id. § 1284.3(a).
147. Id. § 1284.3(b). In its fee waiver procedures, the American Arbitration Association
identifies indigent consumers based on a maximum monthly income of 200 percent of the federal
poverty standard. See supra text accompanying note 55. But for consumers in California, the fee
waiver procedures expressly acknowledge and apply the California statutory definition. Id.
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a request for waiver is a sworn declaration by the consumer of his or
her monthly income and the number of persons in the household. 148
The California statute, by its terms, does not provide for the
invalidation of a consumer arbitration agreement due to excessive
cost. But in Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc.,149 the California Court of
Appeal relied on Section 1284.3(b) in part in permitting claimants to
"resist enforcement of an arbitration agreement that imposes
unaffordable fees."
150
New Mexico took a different approach to regulating arbitration
costs when it enacted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA")
in 2001.151 The New Mexico non-uniform version of RUAA defines a
"disabling civil dispute clause" as a clause that modifies or limits
"procedural rights necessary or useful to a consumer, borrower, tenant
or employee in the enforcement of substantive rights against a party
drafting a standard form contract or lease." 152 The definition
specifically lists as an example a clause requiring a consumer to
"assert a claim against the party who prepared the form in a forum
that is ... more costly ... than a judicial forum established in this
state for resolution of the dispute."153  Section 44-7A-5 of the New
Mexico Act then provides that in a consumer or employment
arbitration, such a clause "is unenforceable against and voidable by
the consumer, borrower, tenant or employee." 154  The Section adds
that "[i]f the enforcement of such a clause is at issue as a preliminary
matter in connection with arbitration, the consumer, borrower, tenant
or employee may seek judicial relief to have the clause declared
unenforceable in a court having personal jurisdiction of the parties
and subject matter jurisdiction of the issue."155 The provision has not
yet been applied in any reported cases. 1
56
148. Id. § 1284.3(b)(3). The arbitration institution must keep all information received from
the consumer confidential. Id. § 1284(b)(4). But the arbitration institution "may not keep
confidential the number of waiver requests received or granted, or the total amount of fees
waived." Id.
149. 114 Cal. App. 4th 77 (Ct. App. 2003).
150. Id. at 98.
151. For an overview of RUAA, see Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act:
Modernizing, Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 1.
152. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 (2006).
153. Id. § 44-7A-1(b)(4)(a).
154. Id. § 44-7A-5.
155. Id.
156. Oklahoma has taken yet another approach in its version of RUAA. See 12 OKLA. STAT. §
1880 (2006):
B. In applying and construing the Uniform Arbitration Act, to the extent permitted
by federal law, recognition shall be given to the following considerations as applicable:
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The United States Congress has considered at least one bill
that would regulate arbitration costs, but it has not enacted the bill
into law. 157  The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002 would have
authorized arbitrators or arbitration institutions to:
(A) provide for reimbursement of arbitration fees to the claimant, in whole or in part, as
part of the remedy in accordance with applicable law or in the interests of justice; and
(B) waive, defer, or reduce any fee or charge due from the claimant in the event of
extreme hardship.
1 5 8
Neither of those provisions would add much to typical institutional
arbitration rules, although presumably they would preclude parties
from contracting for a different rule.' 59
These legal approaches, both by courts and legislatures, are
based, to varying degrees, on the assumption that arbitration costs
pose a serious barrier to individual claimants seeking to vindicate
their legal rights. The next Part explores that assumption from an
economic perspective.
1. Agreements to arbitrate are often included in standard forms prepared by one
party and in a context where there is little or no ability to negotiate or change the
terms of the agreement to arbitrate; and
2. In such cases, clauses providing.., for the expenses of arbitration.., and for
other matters that may represent a serious disadvantage to the party or parties that
did not prepare the form shall be closely reviewed for unconscionability based on
unreasonable one-sidedness and understandable or unnoticeable language or lack of
meaningful choice and for balance and fairness in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing.
157. More generally, a number of bills have been introduced into Congress that would limit
or restrict consumer or employment arbitration, either by excluding certain claims from
arbitration or invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements in certain contracts. See, e.g.,
Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory
Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831,
840 (2002). Only one bill has been enacted into law, however: the Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration Fairness Act makes pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable in
motor vehicle franchise agreements (i.e., franchise agreements between car manufacturers and
car dealers). See 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006).
158. S. 3026, 107th Cong. § 2(b)(10) (Oct. 1, 2002).
159. In his statement on introducing the bill, Senator Sessions touted the benefits of
arbitration, asserting that "arbitration can give the consumer and employee a cost-effective
forum in which to assert their claim," particularly for the "overwhelming majority of the people
who could not afford a lawyer to litigate in court." 148 CONG. REC S9721 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Sessions). He explained the arbitration cost provision as follows:
11. Expenses. The bill grants all parties the right to have an arbitrator provide for
reimbursement of arbitration fees in the interests of justice and the reduction,
deferral, or waiver of arbitration fees in cases of extreme hardship. It does little good
to take a claim to arbitration if the consumer or employee cannot even afford the
arbitration fee. This provision ensures that the arbitrator can waive or reduce the fee
or make the company reimburse the consumer or employee for a fee if the interests of
justice so require.
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IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ARBITRATION COSTS
This Part takes an economic approach to analyzing when the
upfront costs of arbitration might preclude a party from asserting a
claim. 160 It relies principally on the expected value model of litigation
(and arbitration) but also considers insights from a real options
approach. The central conclusion is that rather than arbitration costs
interfering with the workings of the contingent fee system, as some
arbitration critics have asserted, the contingent fee system provides a
means for overcoming possible liquidity and risk aversion barriers to
arbitration.
A. Expected Value Model
Under the expected value model of litigation, a prospective
claimant decides whether to file suit in court by comparing the costs
and benefits of litigation.161 The benefits of litigation are the expected
award by the decisionmaker (Jp), either a judge or jury. 62 The costs
of litigation (Cp) include forum costs, other litigation expenses, and
attorneys' fees.163 Under the expected value model, a claimant will file
suit when the expected recovery is greater than the expected litigation
costs-in other words, when Jp - Cp > 0. If Jp - Cp < 0, the claimant
will not proceed with the suit.' 64
The decision to file a claim in arbitration is analogous to the
decision to file suit, although the expected award (J'p) and the
expected costs (C'p) in arbitration may differ from the expected
judgment and the expected costs in court (in other words, J'p may be
160. Thus, I do not address whether consumers and employees are better off in arbitration
than in court, although certainly whether they can assert their claim in arbitration is relevant to
that inquiry.
161. For overviews of the expected value model, see ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE
ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th
ed. 2003); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2003);
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004); ROBERT D. COOTER
& THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2004); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S.
Parker, Civil Procedure: General, in V THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1, 3-4
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Garrit De Geest eds., 2000). For other writings on the subject, see
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399 (1973).
162. Benefits also could include non-financial considerations. A more sophisticated model
would focus on the settlement value of the case rather than the expected judgment. The more
simplified model used here is sufficient for my purposes.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
164. Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 226-27 (2000).
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more or less than Jp, and Cp may be more or less than Cp). 165 The
party will assert its claim in arbitration so long as the expected
arbitration award is greater than the expected cost of the arbitration
process (J'p > C'p). The party will not assert its claim in the converse
case: when the expected cost is greater than the expected award (J'p <
Cp).
Lawsuits that are not economically viable under this model are
known as negative expected value suits (or in arbitration, presumably,
negative expected value claims). As defined by Lucian Bebchuk, "[a]
negative expected value suit is one in which the plaintiff would obtain
a negative expected return from pursuing the suit all the way to
judgment-that is, one in which the plaintiffs expected total litigation
costs would exceed the expected judgment. 166 Actually, an extensive
literature exists identifying a variety of circumstances in which
claimants have the incentive to assert claims with a negative expected
value. 167 In other words, even the fact that a claim has a negative
expected value does not necessarily mean that the claimant will not
bring the claim in court (or in arbitration). Nevertheless, to the extent
it is useful to try and give an economic content to the idea that
arbitration costs may be a barrier to a claimant asserting a claim, a
negative expected value claim seems like a reasonable shorthand for
such a claim (even though an overbroad one).
165. I assume here that the parties have entered into a pre-dispute arbitration clause, so
that the claimant's options after the claim arises are either to file a claim in arbitration or not to
file a claim in arbitration. A third possibility, of course, is for the claimant to challenge the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement in court, which I take up momentarily. For an
economic analysis of the decision whether to enter into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, see
Hylton, supra note 164, at 223-28; Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995).
166. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Suits with a Negative Expected Value, in 3 NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 551-54 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). The fact that a
claim has a negative expected value does not necessarily mean that it is a frivolous claim. It may
be a meritorious claim but one that is so costly to litigate that a claimant cannot do so
economically. POSNER, supra note 30, at 632.
167. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437 (1988) (imperfect information); Avery Katz, The Effects of Frivolous Lawsuits on the
Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990) (imperfect information); David
Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance Value, 5
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (differences in the timing of litigation costs incurred by plaintiffs
and defendants); David C. Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling the Stonewall: Retaining
Lawyers to Bolster Credibility, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165 (1996) (plaintiffs pre-commitment to
pay his or her attorney part of the litigation costs); Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, A Reputation
for Being a Nuisance: Frivolous Lawsuits and Fee Shifting in a Repeated Game, 18 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 147 (1998) (attorney who develops a reputation for bringing negative expected value
claims); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to




It should be clear that the mere fact that a claimant prefers to
bring his or her claim in court does not show that the claim has a
negative expected value in arbitration. A claimant may for any
number of reasons prefer litigation over arbitration ex post, despite
having agreed to arbitrate ex ante. 168 Indeed, under the simple
expected value model described above, once a dispute arises, a
claimant will prefer to be in court instead of arbitration so long as
expected value of the claim in court is greater than its expected value
in arbitration ((Jp - Cp) > (J'p - C'p)).169 This condition certainly can
be satisfied in cases in which the claim is not a negative expected
value claim in arbitration (i.e., when J'p - C'p > 0).
Of course, the fact that a claim has a negative expected value
in arbitration does not necessarily mean that it has a positive
expected value in litigation. Indeed, one would expect that most
claims that are not cost justified to pursue in arbitration also are not
cost justified to pursue in litigation. Thus, for costs to preclude a
claimant from asserting a claim in arbitration, the claim must have a
positive expected value in court.
Finally, note that in the expected value model, what matters to
the claimant's decision whether to file a claim in arbitration is the
expected award and the expected costs-the total costs, not merely the
upfront costs. A claim has a negative expected value if the entire
expected cost of the process (including attorneys' fees and other
litigation expenses, not just arbitrator's fees and administrative fees)
exceeds the expected award. Thus, the expected value model seems
consistent with those who have defended arbitration against cost-
based challenges by arguing that the total process costs are lower in
arbitration. 170 Likewise, the claimant's personal financial condition
plays no role in the decision whether to file a claim under this model.
What matters are the characteristics of the claim-its value (the
expected award) and the resources it will take to obtain that value
(the expected cost).
B. Option Theory and Arbitration
The expected value model assumes that the claimant faces a
one-time decision whether to file a claim and makes that decision by
168. Drahozal, supra note 62, at 749-50.
169. Moreover, the claimant will challenge the enforceability of the arbitration agreement in
court so long as the expected cost of the challenge (e) is less than the expected benefit from the
challenge (the probability of success (p) times the claimant's benefit from being in court (i.e., e <
p((Jp - Cp)- (J'p - C'p))).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
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comparing the expected costs and benefits. Bradford Cornell
described the assumptions underlying the expected value model as
follows:
In deciding whether to sue or whether to settle, the litigants consider the costs and
benefits under the assumption that they must either settle promptly or go to trial.
There are no intermediate decisions to be made along the way. Under these conditions,
the discounted cash flow model can be used to analyze litigation investments. 
1 7 1
This assumption, of course, is overly simplistic. At a number of
points during the litigation (or arbitration) process, claimants obtain
new information and can decide whether to continue with or drop a
claim. As a result, it is increasingly common to model the litigation
process as involving a series of options, with the claimant deciding at
the appropriate time whether to exercise each option (pay his or her
lawyer to continue with the case) or not (and simply drop the claim).
172
Under the option model, a claimant will file suit when the
option value of the case is greater than the exercise price (or strike
price) of the option-the costs of proceeding to the next decision point.
While seemingly just a restatement of the requirements for positive
expected value claims under the expected value model, in fact there
are important differences between the two models. Most
fundamentally, the option value of a case will never be lower, and may
well be higher, than its expected value. 173 This reality has several
implications for the problem of arbitration costs.
First, the option model provides another set of circumstances in
which it may make economic sense to assert a negative expected value
claim. Because the option value of a claim may exceed its expected
value, the claimant may have an incentive to file a claim with a
negative expected value in court (or in arbitration). 174 Although the
expected value is negative, the option value may still exceed the
exercise price of the option. The intuition is straightforward. At the
time of filing, a case has a range of possible outcomes-some positive,
some negative. Because filing does not commit the claimant to litigate
the case to judgment, the claimant might file even a claim with a
negative expected value. As information is revealed during the
litigation process, the claimant can simply drop the claim if it proves
to have a negative outcome without incurring the cost of litigating the
171. Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
173, 173 (1990).
172. E.g., Cornell, supra note 171, at 173; Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in
Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47 (2004); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H.
Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006).
173. Cornell, supra note 171, at 176-82.
174. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 172, 1277; Huang, supra note 172, at 63-64.
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matter all the way to judgment. 175 As a result, the option value even
of negative expected value claims can be positive. Thus, as stated
above, using negative expected value as a proxy overstates the
number of cases in which arbitration costs truly are a barrier to
asserting a claim.
Second, the option model suggests another reason why
claimants may have an ex post preference for litigation over
arbitration-in other words, another reason why claimants may have
an incentive to challenge the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
court. 176 Under the expected value model, the variance of the expected
award and the expected costs are immaterial to whether risk neutral
claimants will file a claim or which forum they prefer. What matters
is the mean, not the variance. By contrast, increased variance is
highly material to the option value of a claim. As Joseph Grundfest
and Peter Huang stated, "a lawsuit's variance can be important
because it reflects the value of the ability to adjust to newly learned
information independently of the litigants' attitudes toward risk."177
The greater the variance of a claim, the more upside it has. If the
upside does not pan out, the claimant simply drops the claim-i.e.,
declines to exercise the next option. Thus, cases with a higher
variance have a higher option value. If, as some evidence suggests,
jury decisions have a higher variance than decisions by arbitrators, 178
the option value of a case will be higher in court than in arbitration,
giving the claimant added incentive to try to avoid arbitration.
Third, the option model highlights a possible economic effect of
upfront arbitration costs on a claimant's decision to file a claim.
Under the expected value model, arbitration may have higher
expected costs than litigation-even assuming total process costs are
the same-by changing the timing of those costs. Costs incurred
earlier in the process have a higher discounted present value. Under
the option model, even if the mean expected costs are identical, the
175. The characterization is even stronger when viewed from the perspective of the plaintiffs
attorney. As Kritzer explains, "[t]he work of the contingency fee lawyer can best be viewed as the
management of a portfolio of cases." HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS:
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 11, 12-16 (2004). The attorney can
have an incentive to bring (and finance) even negative expected value cases as part of his or her
portfolio because the attorney can drop the cases that prove to have poor outcomes while
continuing to litigate the cases that prove to have favorable outcomes.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
177. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 172, at 1276.
178. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 221-35
(1995); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical




timing of those costs can have a significant affect on the option value
of the claim. According to Grundfest and Huang, "all other factors
constant, a rule that causes litigation costs to be front-loaded will tend
to reduce a lawsuit's option settlement value because a plaintiff must
then incur larger expenses before gaining the advantage of the
information that is disclosed" later in the case. 179 By increasing the
cost of filing a claim-i.e., by increasing the costs a claimant must
incur before obtaining information about the case after
filing-arbitration reduces the option value of the claim, making it less
likely that the claim will be economical to assert.
At bottom, however, the inquiry under the option model is
conceptually the same as under the expected value model. A claimant
will assert a claim when the value of the option exceeds the cost of
exercising that option. The values are different but the comparison is
the same. Notably, under both theories it is not just the upfront costs
of arbitration that affect the parties' decision whether to arbitrate, but
the total costs of the process.180 In addition, under neither theory-in
this simple model-does the wealth of the claimant enter into the
determination. Thus, the option model, like the expected value model,
raises questions about the legal analysis of cost-based challenges in
the courts.
C. Liquidity, Risk Aversion, and Contingent Fee Contracts
Under both the expected value model and the option model, as
described above, a claimant considers the total costs of arbitration, not
merely the upfront costs, in deciding whether to file a claim.
Similarly, it is the value of the claim (relative to the total costs) on
which the decision to file is based, not the wealth or financial
condition of the claimant. But the simple models described above
implicitly (if not explicitly) assume claimants are risk neutral. They
also assume away any liquidity constraints a claimant might have in
financing the litigation. If, however, claimants are risk averse181 or
face liquidity constraints, upfront costs might preclude a claimant
from asserting his or her claim in arbitration.
For a claimant in arbitration, the prospect of obtaining an
award is an uncertain event: there is only a probability that the
179. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 172, at 1312.
180. Id. at 1275.
181. A claimant is risk averse when he or she would prefer a smaller, certain amount to a
larger, uncertain amount. For example, a claimant is risk averse if he or she would prefer a
certain sum of $100 to a 50% chance of receiving $200. A claimant is risk neutral if he or she is
indifferent between a certain sum of $100 and a 50% chance of receiving $200.
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arbitrator will find in the claimant's favor, and then a range of
possible amounts the arbitrator might award. By comparison,
arbitration costs are a (relatively) certain amount that the claimant
must pay upfront in order to bring the claim.18 2 To the extent
claimants are risk averse, they may be unwilling to incur the certain
upfront cost in an attempt to obtain an uncertain recovery. As a
result, even if the claim otherwise is economically viable, the upfront
costs of arbitration may deter a risk averse claimant from asserting
the claim.1
8 3
In addition, legal claims are not freely transferable among
parties, which limits the ability of claimants to finance litigation (or
arbitration) by using their claim as collateral for a loan.'8 4 To the
extent individuals cannot obtain financing from outside sources, they
must rely on their own income and assets to finance the case. If
individuals face serious liquidity constraints in arbitrating their
claims, then the upfront costs of arbitration might preclude them from
filing a claim in the first place. Moreover, in such a case, the extent of
the claimant's income and assets certainly would be relevant in
evaluating the extent of the liquidity constraint.
Indeed, at least some courts and commentators appear to
recognize that risk aversion and liquidity constraints of individuals
are central to the cost-based criticisms of arbitration. The Sixth
Circuit in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.18 5 noted the importance
of risk aversion when it asserted that claimants may be "inclined to
err on the side of caution" in deciding whether to file a claim in
arbitration. 8 6 In The Costs of Arbitration, Public Citizen cited the
difficulty that low-income claimants may face in trying to raise the
182. I say "relatively" certain because if the claimant prevails the arbitrator may require the
respondent to reimburse the claimant for the upfront arbitration costs. See supra text
accompanying notes 59-62.
183. Under prospect theory, individuals are assumed to be risk averse as to gains but risk
seekers as to losses. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses,
and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996); Russell Korobkin, Aspirations
and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (2002); Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A
Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000). If arbitration costs were framed as losses,
then they might be less likely to deter claimants from arbitrating their claims.
184. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 700-
01 (2005); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a
Market for Champerty, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 625 (1995). Of course, if a claimant can obtain
financing for his or her claim, then liquidity barriers would not be a reason for invalidating the
arbitration clause.
185. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
186. Id. at 665.
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money needed to pay the upfront costs of arbitration.18 7 Other courts
and commentators, too, while not explicitly citing liquidity and risk
aversion, necessarily assume that those barriers exist.
But while liquidity constraints and risk aversion are central to
the cost-based criticism of arbitration, those same courts and
commentators ignore the principal device used in American litigation
for providing financing and risk management for individual claimants:
the contingent fee contract. Contingent fees are widely used in
American litigation, not only in personal injury cases but in a wide
variety of cases.188 Similarly, many claimants in arbitration are
represented on a contingent fee basis.18 9
A typical contingent fee contract provides that in exchange for
the attorney's legal representation, the claimant will pay the attorney
some percentage (often although not always 33%) of any recovery
obtained in the case. 190 If the claimant recovers nothing, no fee is
owed. Under a contingent fee contract, however, the claimant
purchases more than merely legal services. As Herbert M. Kritzer
explained:
The normal hourly fee or flat fee simply purchases the services of a lawyer. Under a
contingency fee arrangement, the client also purchases additional services. The first is
financing .... By their nature, contingency fees are not normally collected until the
matter is closed. Very often, lawyers also defer the collection of expenses until the close
of a case. Thus, the contingency fee lawyer finances the litigation for the client while a
case is pending.
The second additional service that the client purchases is a form of insurance. While in
many states clients are liable for expenses regardless of the outcome of a case, the
reality is that lawyers who pursue a case unsuccessfully on a contingency basis seldom
collect those expenses (or even seek to collect them). Thus, the lawyer effectively insures
the client for the expenses associated with pursuing a claim. 191
187. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 1, at 52-53.
188. KRITZER, supra note 175, at 36 (listing types of cases handled by lawyers on contingent
fee basis); Painter, supra note 184, at 626 & n.3 (listing types of cases and noting that "[n]inety-
five percent of personal injury cases are taken on a contingency").
189. See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP.
RESOL. J. 9, 12 (May-June 2003) (finding that in the sample of AAA employment arbitrations
studied, "most lower-income employees have agreed to representation on a contingency basis").
190. KRITZER, supra note 175, at 39.
191. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,
47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 270 (1998); see also POSNER, supra note 30, at 624 ('The solution to this
liquidity problem is the contingent fee contract."); ALEXANDER TABARROK & ERIC HELLAND, TWO
CHEERS FOR CONTINGENT FEES 6-7 (2005) (arguing that contingent-fee system results in
"Improved Access to the Legal System" and "Risk Spreading"); Painter, supra note 184, at 653
(arguing that "[a] lawyer working on a contingent fee" is not only providing legal services, but
also is providing "credit - postponing payment until the client collects on a judgment" and
"insurance - agreeing to waive payment for legal services that do not achieve favorable results");
Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers' Contingent Fee Contracts,
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The contingent fee contract thus provides a mechanism to overcome
both the liquidity and risk aversion constraints individuals face in
litigating their claims.
As noted by Kritzer, a common practice in contingent fee cases
is for the claimant's attorney to advance on behalf of the client the
costs of litigating the case. Examples of costs that might be advanced
include discovery costs, expert witness fees, and the like. If the
claimant prevails, the attorney obtains repayment of the advances
from the judgment or award. If the claimant does not prevail, the
attorney rarely if ever seeks to recover the advance, a practice
expressly approved by at least some states' ethics rules 92 and
seemingly common regardless. 193 As a result, contingent fee contracts
provide financing and insurance not only for attorneys' fees but other
litigation expenses as well.
But forum costs, including arbitration costs, are simply another
form of litigation costs. On the face of it, there is no reason to expect
contingent fee contracts to treat arbitration costs differently than they
treat other litigation expenses. One would expect lawyers to advance
arbitration costs for their clients, just like any other litigation
expense-provided that the claim is economically viable based on the
expected award and the expected total costs of arbitration.
47 DEPAuL L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1998) (citing four functions of contingent fee contracts: (1)
expanding access to justice by enabling claimants to finance litigation; (2) providing a source of
financial credit; (3) avoiding agency costs due to shirking by lawyers; and (4) "offer[ing] clients a
form of legal expense insurance"); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic
Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1969-
1970) (citing, among other "common justifications" given for contingent fees, that "[t]he
contingent fee allows the client to shift some of the risk inherent in his case to the lawyer" and
"allows the client to borrow the lawyer's services in advance of settlement").
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2006):
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending
or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of
litigation on behalf of the client.
193. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing
Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH U. L.Q. 653, 735 (2003) ("[M]any firms make no effort
to seek reimbursement of expenses if there is no recovery."); Kevin M. Clermont & John D.
Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 532 n.3 (1978) ("In event of
defeat, the client theoretically must refund all of these litigation expenses advanced by the
lawyer.... [In] [a]ctual practice, however .... the client usually does not pay back these
expenses."); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 349 n.71 (1991) ("In
practice, attorneys rarely attempt to collect expenses from personal injury clients, both because
it would be impractical and because such a practice might drive away future clients.").
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Indeed, some anecdotal evidence suggests that this is in fact
the case. For example, the Missouri Bar's Sample Fee Agreement for
contingent fee contracts provides that "Client agrees to pay for all
costs and expenses paid or owed by Client in connection with this
matter, or which have been advanced by Lawyer on Client's behalf."194
The form contract goes on to state that "[c]osts and expenses
commonly include . . . professional mediator, arbitrator and/or special
master fees and similar other items."195  A fee agreement for the
Caruso Law Offices, P.C., available on the Internet, defines costs as
"any expenditure, fee or charge which, at Attorneys' discretion, may be
incurred to prosecute Client's claim, including but not limited to...
mediation or arbitration fees." 196  The fee agreement (for premises
liability cases) for Winer Menuela & Devens LLP likewise includes
"arbitration costs" in its list of costs to "be reimbursed by the client(s)
at the conclusion of the case," implying that the attorneys typically
would advance those costs if necessary.197
An additional anecdote comes from the federal district court's
opinion in Mattox v. Decision One Mortgage Co. 198 The plaintiff in
Mattox filed a class action against a bank and mortgage company
asserting violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.
The district court rejected a cost-based challenge to the arbitration
agreement, holding that the respondent's offer to pay all arbitration
costs protected the claimant from having to bear excessive costs.
Included as part of the evidence introduced by the claimant in support
of the challenge was an affidavit by the claimant's attorney, in which
the attorney stated that he "would not, as a matter of business
discretion, advance arbitration fees on the claims at issue in this case,
if the matter is referred to arbitration."'199 The affidavit is suggestive
of a practice among at least some contingent fee attorneys of
advancing arbitration costs, even if on the facts of this case the
attorney would not do so. 20 0
194. THE MISSOURI BAR, SAMPLE FEE AGREEMENT: FORMS & COMMENTS 15 (Revised Apr.
2003), available at http:/Jhome.mobar.org/lpmonline/fdrsamples.pdf.
195. Id.
196. Caruso Law Offices, Agreement for Representation by Counsel, 3 (copy on file with
author). The agreement goes on to state that the "[cllient is responsible for costs irrespective of
outcome" and that "[aittorneys have the option to advance costs but are not required to do so."
Id.
197. Winer Mehuela & Devens LLP, Attorney Fee Agreement and Authorization (Premises
Liability), http://www.pacificlaw.com/files/attorney-fee-premises-f.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
198. No. 01-10657-GAO, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18066 (D. Mass. Sept. 26, 2002).
199. Id. at *9-10.
200. As noted above, the claimant sought to bring the suit as a class action in court, which
likely would not have been permitted in arbitration. According to the claimant's attorney, the
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This anecdotal evidence plainly is not conclusive, 201 but it is
suggestive. Certainly more systematic empirical work would be
useful. But even if such studies fail to find that attorneys regularly
advance arbitration costs, 202 it may be due to cases like the Sixth
Circuit's Morrison decision. Cases invalidating arbitration
agreements on cost grounds provide a strong disincentive for lawyers
to finance arbitration costs, because if the lawyers do so, they may
deprive their clients of a possible ground for invalidating the
arbitration agreement in court.
At bottom, then, Public Citizen and the Morrison court have it
exactly backwards. Arbitration costs do not "severely restrict, or
eliminate, the advantage a consumer has under the contingency fee
system." 20 3 Instead, the contingent fee system provides a mechanism
for overcoming possible liquidity and risk aversion constraints due to
arbitration costs.
V. REEXAMINING THE LEGAL DOCTRINE
The previous Part challenges the cost-based criticism of
arbitration as misguided in a critical respect: instead of arbitration
costs interfering with the workings of contingent fee contracts,
contingent fee contracts provide a mechanism for overcoming possible
liquidity and risk aversion constraints due to the upfront costs of
arbitration. This Part suggests some doctrinal implications of that
analysis and revisits the empirical study of federal court cases
resolving cost-based challenges.
A. Analyzing Cost-Based Challenges to Arbitration Agreements
The analysis in Part IV has several implications for the
analysis of cost-based challenges to arbitration agreements in the
individual claims in arbitration likely would have provided a "relatively small recovery." Id. at
*10.
201. One possibility for some of the contracts is that the provisions were intended to deal
with court-annexed arbitration, rather than contractual arbitration.
202. See, e.g., Sprague v. Household Int'l, No. 04-0106-CV-W-NKL, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11694, at *21 (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2005):
During a teleconference with the parties on July 20, 2004, Household argued that the
Plaintiffs would not be responsible for paying arbitration fees due to a contingency fee
arrangement with their counsel. When the Plaintiffs denied that allegation, the Court
ordered the Plaintiffs to submit their fee agreement under seal for in camera
inspection. After reviewing the agreement, the Court determined that the agreement
would require the Plaintiffs to bear all costs of arbitration, including the arbitration
fees.
203. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 1, at 65.
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courts. First, as a case-by-case approach, it differs from what has
been described as a per se standard used by the Ninth Circuit in
holding arbitration clauses unconscionable on the basis of cost. The
Ninth Circuit stated that (under both California and Washington law)
an arbitration clause is unconscionable when it imposes higher costs
than the otherwise applicable court filing fee. 20 4 The analysis here
suggests that a case-by-case approach is preferable because in at least
some cases the claimant's attorney may be able to advance the costs of
arbitration on behalf of the claimant. In such cases, the upfront costs
of arbitration will not be a barrier to claimants bringing a claim. 20 5
Second, the analysis raises serious questions about the
holdings of courts, like the Sixth Circuit in Morrison, that are
explicitly based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between
contingent fee contracts and arbitration costs. The Sixth Circuit in
Morrison reasoned that contingent fee contracts enable claimants to
avoid most, if not all, upfront costs in litigation, but that claimants
must pay arbitration costs upfront regardless of whether they have a
contingent fee contract with their attorney. That view incorrectly
treats arbitration costs as somehow different from other litigation
expenses, when there is every reason to treat them the same. This
fundamental misunderstanding suggests that the Sixth Circuit should
revisit its approach to resolving cost-based challenges. Possible
changes are discussed below.
Third, at least in cases in which the claimant is represented by
counsel, any case-by-case approach for analyzing arbitration costs
must consider the availability of possible sources of financing in
addition to the claimant's personal income and assets. Courts that
focus solely on the claimant's personal assets and income are taking
too narrow of a view.
Beyond these general implications, stating the economic
analysis is much easier than implementing it in the form of a legal
test. Courts are not well suited to calculate the expected award in
arbitration and to compare it to expected arbitration costs (much less
to calculate the option value of a claim and to compare it to the
exercise price). Cost-based challenges occur early in the case when
204. See A1-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Washington law); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2003)
(California law); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (California law); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (California law); see also Musnick v.
King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Ninth Circuit
as applying per se standard to cost-based challenges).
205. Indeed, the claimants might be better off in arbitration than in litigation if the total
process costs in arbitration are less.
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little evidence on the merits may be available. Moreover, if in fact the
arbitration agreement is enforceable, having a court make findings on
the merits of the case would usurp the function of the arbitrator in
adjudicating the parties' dispute.
A few proxies are available. First, the amount sought in the
complaint provides some indication of the maximum expected value of
the claim. Claimants have little incentive to minimize the amount
they assert as damages (although this analysis might give them a
reason to do so).206 Of course, a large amount claimed does not
necessarily mean that a claim has a large expected value (even from
the claimant's perspective). While the amount sought may be large,
the probability of recovery may be small.
Second, courts should take into account the applicability of fee
shifting statutes in determining whether a claim is economical to
bring in arbitration. As the Supreme Court stated in Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air,20 7 the purpose of fee-
shifting statutes is to "enable private parties to obtain legal help in
seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened
violation of specific federal laws."208 The prospect of a fee recovery may
make even a case seeking small monetary damages attractive to an
attorney.209 Thus, in evaluating the amount at stake in arbitration
(and thus whether the claim is economical to bring), a court must
consider not only the damages sought by the claimant but also any
possible attorneys' fee recovery. 210
Third, whether a claimant is represented by counsel is an
important consideration. Certainly, if the claimant is proceeding pro
se, the claimant does not have a lawyer to advance the costs of
arbitration. In such a case, the central argument of this Article would
be inapplicable. Conversely, however, the fact that a claimant
currently is represented by counsel in court does not necessarily mean
that the claim is a viable one if brought in arbitration. Some of the
206. In fact, claimants in court have an incentive to claim larger rather than smaller
amounts of damages because of possible anchoring of jury awards on the amount sought by the
plaintiff. Arbitration costs may constrain that incentive to some degree, as noted earlier. See
supra note 49.
207. 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
208. Id. at 565.
209. See Brief of Petitioners at 46-47, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)
(No. 99-1235) (citing attorneys' fee provision of TILA and stating that "[g]iven these incentives, it
is no surprise that this Court has addressed numerous cases involving parties who brought
individual lawsuits to vindicate their rights under TILA").
210. See, e.g., Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-639 (4th Cir. 2002);




value of the claim in court may be due to the possibility that the court
would invalidate the arbitration clause, permitting the claim to be
resolved in court.
One possible approach would be to permit discovery into the fee
arrangements between claimants and their attorneys. 211 If the fee
agreement provides for the attorney to advance arbitration costs on
behalf of the claimant, the court should reject the cost-based
challenge. The problem with this approach is that it provides a strong
incentive for strategic contracting between attorneys and their clients.
Attorneys would only agree to advance arbitration costs for clients
when they did not intend to challenge the arbitration agreement in
court. 212 As a result, discovery is not likely to provide meaningful
information. At the very least, however, courts should consider the
possible availability of other financing sources, in particular the
claimant's attorney, when ruling on cost-based challenges.
None of this is to deny that there may be cases in which
upfront arbitration costs might preclude claimants from asserting
claims. Cases with pro se claimants are of particular concern, as are
claimants with small individual claims and no possible attorneys' fee
recovery. But this analysis gives reason to doubt that such cases are
as common as some have asserted and argues for taking a more
critical view of cost-based challenges.
B. Revisiting the Cases
This Section revisits the empirical study in Part III.C in light
of the preceding analysis. 213 It examines the sample of post-Green
Tree federal court cases and finds little evidence that (1) arbitration
costs would preclude claimants from bringing a claim in those cases; 21 4
or (2) that the cases in which courts invalidated arbitration clauses on
cost grounds were more problematic than those cases in which the
courts rejected the cost-based challenge.
211. At least one court already has done so. Sprague v. Household Int'l, No. 04-0106-CV-W-
NKL, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11694, at *21 (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2005).
212. Indeed, there may already be a two-tiered market for legal services under contingent fee
contracts. One tier of lawyers, willing to handle cases in arbitration, might routinely advance the
costs of arbitration. Another tier of lawyers, who handle only cases in court, would not advance
arbitration costs, instead relying on the possibility a claimant might incur prohibitive costs as a
basis for challenging the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. The different tiers of
lawyers might follow different business models, with lower-risk/lower-return firms in the first
tier and higher-riskfhigher-return firms in the second tier.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 132-143.
214. Of course, some claimants deterred from bringing claims might not challenge the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement in federal court (or any court). The cases studied
obviously provide no information about how many such cases exist.
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Given the role that contingent fee contracts can play in
overcoming liquidity and risk aversion barriers to arbitration, an
important consideration is the extent to which the claimants are
represented by counsel. Again, representation by counsel is not
determinative, as a case might be economically viable in court solely
because of the possibility that the court would invalidate the
arbitration agreement. 215 Nonetheless, if a substantial proportion of
claimants in litigated cases were proceeding pro se, it would cast
serious doubt on the importance of contingent fee contracts as a means
of mitigating the possible effects of arbitration costs.
Of the claimants in the 163 federal court cases listed in
Appendix A, only one proceeded pro se; 216 the rest (161 of 162, or
99.4%) were represented by counsel. 217 Of the claimants represented
by counsel, only eight (of 161, or 5.0%) were identified in the court's
opinion as being represented solely by a law school clinic or non-profit
public interest group.218  Thus, most claimants who challenged
arbitration agreements in federal court appear to have been
represented by an attorney who was in a position to advance the costs
of arbitration on behalf of the claimant.
Another consideration is the amount at stake in the case. All
else being equal, claimants with small claims would seem at greater
risk of being adversely affected by arbitration costs. For cases in
which the only basis for federal court jurisdiction is diversity of
citizenship (i.e., those involving only state court claims), the diversity
statute requires that the minimum amount in controversy be at least
$75,000.219 For cases based on federal question jurisdiction, there is
no minimum amount in controversy required. 220 Hence the dollar
amounts of those claims could be quite small. Notably, however, most
of the cases included claims under federal statutes that authorize the
award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.221 A substantial
215. See supra text accompanying notes 210-211.
216. See McBride v. St. Anthony Messenger Magazine, No. 2:02-cv-0237-JDT-WTL, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6449 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2003). The court in that case upheld the arbitration
clause against the cost-based challenge.
217. In one case, the opinion did not indicate whether either the plaintiff or the defendant
was represented by counsel.
218. In some cases, while counsel for the claimant was identified by name, no affiliation for
the attorney was listed.
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
220. Id. § 1331.
221. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006) (Title VII); 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(5) (2006) (Real
Estate Settlement Practices Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2006) (Truth in Lending Act); 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (2006) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (2006)
(Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act).
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proportion of the cases-at least 78.1% (57 of 73) of those brought by
individual employees 222 and 63.4% (26 of 41) of those brought by
individual consumers, 223 as well as 83.3% (35 of 42) of the class
claims 224--included at least one federal claim permitting a successful
claimant to recover attorneys' fees. 225 When a claimant has a claim for
attorneys' fees, the stakes are much greater than simply the amount
of the claimant's loss.
Class claims present some additional issues. In some class
cases, particularly consumer cases, the individual amount at stake can
be very small. The likely arbitration costs may greatly exceed the
amount the individual claimant is likely to recover. Of course in many
of the class cases studied here, the claimant has at least one claim
under a federal statute permitting recovery of attorneys' fees.
Without such a statute, an individual's claim would appear to be a
negative expected value claim. With such a statute, that is by no
means clear.
Even if a class claim has a negative expected value in
arbitration, however, that should not provide a legal basis for
challenging the arbitration agreement on cost grounds. In such cases,
it is the lack of a means of aggregating claims in arbitration that
makes the claim a negative expected value claim, not higher costs in
arbitration. The individual, non-aggregated claims would be no more
222. Of the cases brought by individual employees, forty-two included claims under Title VII,
five included claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, four included claims
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, two included claims under the Family and Medical
Leave Act, two included claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and two included civil rights
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Twelve cases raised solely state claims, including claims under
the D.C., Florida, and Virgin Islands Civil Rights Acts, and two others were described as
involving a claim of discrimination and a claim of age discrimination respectively. Two case
reports did not specify the claims at issue.
223. Of the cases brought by individual consumers, eighteen included claims under the
Truth in Lending Act, three included claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, two included
claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, two included RICO claims, and one included
securities fraud claims. Fourteen cases raised solely state law claims, including a claim under
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and a claim under the Oregon Unfair Trade Practices Act.
One case report did not specify the claims at issue in the case.
224. Of the class cases, fourteen included claims under the Truth in Lending Act, five
included claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, four included claims under the Fair Credit
Billing Act, three included claims under the federal antitrust laws, two included claims under
Title VII, and one each included claims under the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, RICO, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Credit Repair
Organizations Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. One included unspecified federal
claims. Five cases raised solely state law claims, one of which was a claim under the California
Consumer Protection Act and one of which was a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.
Two case reports did not specify the claims at issue.
225. The other cases may have included such a claim, but there was no indication from the
court's opinion that they did.
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economical to pursue in court than in arbitration. It is only because
class relief generally is not available in arbitration that the claim has
a negative expected value in arbitration.
As an economic matter, the lack of class relief in arbitration
can have exactly the same effect as a difference in expected costs-it
can turn positive expected value claims into negative expected value
claims. But as a legal matter, the distinction can be a critical one. As
the Supreme Court stated in Perry v. Thomas, 226 the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA") precludes a court from "rely[ing] on the
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable," for example,
because it would treat arbitration clauses differently than other
contract provisions-which the FAA does not permit. 227 Accordingly,
state law challenges to arbitration agreements cannot be based on
unique characteristics of the arbitration process, such as the lack of
class relief.
228
Indeed, many courts have rejected challenges to the
enforceability of arbitration agreements based on the ground that
class relief is (generally) unavailable in arbitration. 229 By recasting
the challenges as based on arbitration costs, at least some claimants
are seeking to do an end run around these cases.230 Myriam Gilles
described these sorts of cases as involving "second-wave challenges" to
the lack of class relief in arbitration and concluded that "[i]t is not
clear to what extent these ... challenges will find traction in the
federal courts."231 These cases are not properly brought as cost-based
226. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
227. Id. at 492 n.9 (dicta).
228. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 411
(2004).
229. See, e.g., Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 816-19 (11th Cir. 2001). See
generally Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
230. See Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 01-1752, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1027 at *7 (3d
Cir. Jan. 7, 2002) (unpublished) ("But Johnson [v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir.
2000)] makes clear that the TILA does not provide an unwaivable right to a class action. Lloyd
may not attempt to end-run that holding by couching his claim in terms of unvindicated rights.");
Taylor v. First N. Am. Nat'l Bank, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2004):
[T]he gist of her argument is that it does not make economic sense to bring individual
TILA claims. This may be true as a matter of fact, but it is an argument that applies
to claims litigated in federal court as much as to claims litigated before an arbitrator.
Furthermore, to the extent that Taylor's argument is that the bad economics of
individual lawsuits means that she should have a right to bring a class action as the
only way to enforce her rights under TILA and the FCBA, that argument is exactly
the one rejected by the court in Randolph [v. Green Tree].
231. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 408 (2005).
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challenges. If the lack of class relief in (at least some) arbitration
proceedings is a problem, it should be addressed directly, not under
the pretense of excessive arbitration costs.
Overall, the cases studied provide little evidence that the cases
in which federal courts invalidated arbitration agreements on cost
grounds are significantly different from the ones in which the courts
upheld the agreements. Individual claims involving only state law
claims (and hence with no federal fee-shifting statute involved) would
seem to be potentially problematic on cost grounds. 23 2 Yet the courts
upheld the arbitration agreement in 13 out of 14 such cases with
consumer claimants (92.9%) and 9 out of 12 cases involving employee
claimants (75%). Conversely, for class claims, in which the real
objection is to non-cost characteristics of arbitration, the courts upheld
the agreement in 25 of 32 cases with consumer claimants (78.1%) and
in only 5 out of 8 cases involving employee claimants (62.5%).
A closer look at the cases in which federal courts invalidated
arbitration agreements on cost grounds likewise provides little
indication that they were particularly problematic under the analysis
suggested here. In the 36 cases in which a federal court invalidated
the arbitration agreement in whole, or in part, on cost grounds, the
claimant was represented by counsel in every case (36 of 36, or 100%)
and asserted a claim that permitted recovery of attorneys' fees in all
but four (32 of 36, or 88.9%)-both above the percentages for the
sample as a whole. The only contrary indication is that in 5 of the 36
(or 13.9%) cases the claimant was represented by a law school or
public interest clinic-a much higher percentage than in the rest of the
sample233-although in all of those cases the claimant asserted a claim
under which attorneys' fees could be recovered. This evidence
suggests that in a substantial majority of those reported cases in
which courts invalidated the arbitration agreement on cost grounds,
arbitration costs may well not have been a barrier to asserting the
claim in arbitration.
Several caveats are in order. First, as discussed earlier,
selection bias limits the inferences that can be drawn from the
results. 234 Second, the study looks only at federal cases, not state
cases. State cases may present a different picture of the nature of
cost-based challenges. Third, the study does not purport to determine
whether some claimants simply never file a claim either in arbitration
232. Some of the state law claims, however, likely involved state fee-shifting statutes.
233. Indeed, the court invalidated the arbitration agreement in five of the eight cases (62.5%)
in which the opinion indicated the claimant was represented by a clinic.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 135-137.
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or in court due to upfront arbitration costs. Nonetheless, the limited
evidence presented suggests that while many circuits have properly
taken a skeptical view of cost-based challenges, others may have been
too willing to invalidate arbitration agreements on cost grounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
A common criticism of arbitration is that upfront costs deny
claimants-particularly consumers and employees-a forum in which
to assert their claims. Some have argued further that arbitration
costs undercut the benefits to claimants of contingent fee contracts,
which permit claimants to defer payment of attorneys' fees and
litigation expenses until they prevail in the case (and if they do not
prevail, avoid such costs altogether). This Article argues that this
criticism has it exactly backwards. Rather than arbitration costs
interfering with the workings of contingent fee contracts, contingent
fee contracts provide a mechanism for overcoming possible liquidity
and risk aversion problems caused by arbitration costs.
For this reason, much of the legal analysis of arbitration cost
challenges is misdirected, focusing too much on the personal finances
of the individual claimant and too little on the incentives for the
attorney to take the case (such as the value of the claim and possible
recovery under fee-shifting statutes). In the vast majority of federal
court cases adjudicating cost-based challenges to arbitration
agreements, the claimant is represented by counsel, and in most cases
has asserted a claim that, if successful, would permit the recovery of
attorneys' fees. This evidence is consistent with the fact that the
substantial majority of federal court decisions (74.8%) since the
Supreme Court's Green Tree case rejected the cost-based challenge.
The decisions invalidating arbitration agreements on cost grounds are
concentrated in only a few circuits. This analysis suggests that those
circuits should reconsider their approaches.
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VII. APPENDIX
Post-Green Tree Federal Court Cases Adjudicating Cost-Based
Challenges to Arbitration Agreements
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